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1Who Leaves, Who Moves In? The Impact of Positive and
Negative Income Shocks on Migration in Senegal
Abla Safir 1
August 2009
JEL Classiﬁcation: O12, O15, O17, O18
Keywords: Geographic Mobility, Transfers, Risk, Rural-Urban Diﬀerences, Senegal
Using a recent household survey conducted in Senegal, I examine the impact of negative and
positive income shocks on departures from and entries in the household. I focus on diﬀerences in
responses to shocks across the urban and rural sectors as well as age and gender groups. Striking
diﬀerences emerge. Positive shocks increase entries of young girls and adult females in rural areas
while they attract adult males in urban areas. Negative shocks decrease the arrivals of boys in urban
areas while, in rural areas, they only impact the entries of adult males. Migration only increases after
negative shocks, for prime-age adults wherever they reside and for adult children of urban household
heads. In addition to migration, I examine private transfers. They show much less contrast between
urban and rural areas but a sharp contrast between males and females. Adult males increase the
amount of transfers they send after positive shocks and receive more transfers after negative shocks,
wherever they reside, pointing towards the use of transfers as insurance. Females send and receive
on average more transfers than males. However, negative shocks do not increase the amount of
transfers they receive. Negative shocks only reduce transfers given by older rural females. Overall,
both in terms of movements and transfers, individuals beneﬁt very diﬀerently from their external
relations, depending on their place of residence, gender and age. Given the heterogenous responses
of migration and private transfers to income shocks, identical public policies may have very diﬀerent
eﬀects for urban and rural areas and across age and gender.
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The impact of income shocks on the lives of households in developing countries has been studied
extensively since the seminal work of Townsend (1994). Negative income shocks can cause households
to increase their labor supply (Kochar (1999), Rose (2001)), take their children out of school and
make them work (Thomas et al. (2004), Jacoby and Skouﬁas (1997)) ; households may sell productive
assets and therefore lose sources of income (Czuckas, Fafchamp and Udry (1998), Kazianga and
Udry (2006), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)) or they may reduce consumption so much so as to
cause illness (Foster (1995), Jensen (2000)). In addition to private means, households use informal
mechanisms to manage risk and cope with shocks collectively, such as credit and informal insurance
(Grimard (1997), Ligon et al. (2002), Udry (1994)). The literature has shown that these mechanisms
are not fully protective (review in Dercon (2002) and review with research agenda in Dercon (2008)
in the case of Africa)). In particular, it is diﬃcult to protect against aggregate income shocks that
hit a whole community, since aggregate shocks may change the prices of assets or labor and since
collective insurance means are much weaker in the face of aggregate shocks.
Migration has also been studied as a means to smooth consumption. If seen as a family strategy,
as in the“New Economics of Labor Migration”(NELM), it is a way to manage risk ex-ante. It oﬀers
a geographical diversiﬁcation of the sources of income and, as Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) and
Paulson (2000) have shown, migrants go to places in which income shocks are negatively correlated
with the income shocks of the places their original households still reside in. Migrant remittances
can then be used as insurance, a topic I review later. There is also a literature on migration as an
ex-post reply to income shocks, although it is more limited. Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) show,
in Mali, that households send migrants away in response to negative income shocks. Halliday (2006)
ﬁnds that migration increases in response to negative idiosyncratic shocks. However, Halliday (2006)
and Yang (2008) both ﬁnd that households aﬀected by earthquakes in El Salvador are less likely to
migrate.
In the above-mentioned papers, except in the case of marriage studied by Rosenzweig and Stark
(1989), the migrant is viewed as an individual leaving alone to ﬁnd a job, creating a new household
in the place he moves to. The role of networks in facilitating migration, in particular international
migration, is deemed as important (Massey (1988), Munshi (2003)). However, networks are viewed
mostly as helping migrants ﬁnd information on employment opportunities and possibly ﬁnancing









































1isting household while, as mentioned previously there is extensive work on transfers exchanged by
households that are engaged in dynamic insurance schemes. While the focus has been on households
receiving money when times are hard, another possible outcome would be for them to send individu-
als, not necessarily workers, to households willing to host them. Exchanging money or people are in
fact the two most substantial ways through which a household may get help from his network, where
network is deﬁned very broadly as anyone exterior to the studied household. This paper examines
migration as a movement into households that already exist, looking into the receiving side, while
most works focus on the sending side. This contributes to the literature through providing a better
understanding of migration per se and a better understanding of collective informal insurance, if the
exchange of people is part of it.
Another contribution of this work is to study positive income shocks. All the works I have
mentioned focus on departures from places or households hit, actually or potentially, by negative
income shocks. The broader literature on income shocks also focuses on negative income shocks.
This is quite understandable as negative shocks may entail serious long-term consequences. However,
to understand risk and income volatility, the positive upheavals in income also need to be studied. 2
Therefore, I carry a detailed description of negative and positive income shocks faced by Senegalese
households. In terms of migration, theoretically, departures can increase in response to both positive
and negative as migration may be a coping mechanism, as shown empirically in the works mentioned
earlier, as well as an investment (Sjastaad (1962), Stark (1991)). In both cases however, the gains
from migration must be superior to its costs. While this is obvious, there is very little knowledge on
the cost of migration and the role of positive income shocks in ﬁnancing it. To better inform policies
towards migration, it is important to assess to what extent migration is a coping mechanism or an
investment, and examining the response of migration to positive and negative income shocks in a
uniﬁed framework provides with important information regarding the motivations to migrate. For
arrivals in the household, I expect positive shocks to play the role of pull factors and, symmetrically,
negative shocks may decrease entries in the household. However, negative income shocks may also
induce arrivals, including returns, of family members earning income or, for instance, replacing
a person who is sick or deceased. If the receipt of transfers, public or private, induces changes
in household composition, it is important to understand these changes and the characteristics of
those who leave or, perhaps more importantly for those targeted by the transfer, those who arrive.
Edmonds, Mammen and Miller (2004) and Ardington, Case and Hosegood (2009), both in the case of
South Africa, show that arrivals in and departures from the household occur in response to increases









































1in income. A diﬀerence with my work though is that they examine the extension of the pension
system to Blacks after the end of the Apartheid, a reform which changed both the level of income
and its regularity as it increased income to pensioners on a regular and guaranteed basis. In this
paper, I compare the impact of unanticipated, mostly transitory shocks, on migration and transfers,
as these are the two mechanisms through which shocks aﬀecting a household can impact his network.
Akresh (2009) is the work that is closest to this paper as he examines the impact of positive and
negative income shocks in sending and receiving household. However, he restricts his study to child
fostering.
I study migration in Senegal, using a new survey,“Pauvret´ e et Structure Familiale”(PSF), which
I helped in designing and collecting. Senegal is particularly suitable and rich in terms of migration
possibilities and patterns. Situated in the Sahel region but with the Atlantic ocean as a Western
border, it oﬀers, for migrants, various location choices which are quite diﬀerent in terms of geography
and occupations. It is also a signiﬁcant purveyor of international migrants, both within and outside
of Africa. 3 Moreover, with an average household size of eight, which is big even by African standards,
household structures in Senegal go from small nuclear families to complex households composed of
several subgroups who cooperate and pool incomes only partially, if at all. 37% of married women
are in a polygamous union while child fostering is a tradition which still prevails today. As both may
entail migration, these two examples show that migration in Senegal does not only entail movements
of adults creating a new household as they marry or take on a new job. Migration often entails
entering a household which already exists and with which ties, more or less strong, have helped the
migration. When migration occurs because of marriage or fostering, it is driven by positive pull
factors, not only in the classic sense of rich regions which attract migrants, but also in the sense of
rich households hosting new members. Migration must then be studied both at the individual level
and at the household level to understand the characteristics of individuals moving in comparison
with the characteristics of the households they move to or leave from. Examining income shocks
must also allow for heterogeneous impacts, across sex and age groups as diﬀerent groups may be
aﬀected diﬀerently by negative or positive shocks. For instance, the literature on migration has paid
a lot of attention to male migration. If this literature is to be believed, negative income shocks may
impact the departure of males looking for work but perhaps not that of females.
I complement the study of migration with a study of private transfers. Usually, when migration
3. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable estimates on the number of Senegalese abroad. Estimates lie between 900,000 and
1,900,000 depending on sources (Marfaing, 2003). Senegalese migrants registered in Senegal’s representations abroad









































1and transfers are viewed together, the literature examines the remittances of a recent migrant to
either his household of origin or his close relatives, most generally his parents. The literature focuses
on the motivations for a migrant to send transfers. Transfers may be part of a strategic behavior
for later inheritance (Lucas and Stark (1985)). They may also be an investment for migrants willing
to return to their area of origin (de La Bri` ere et al. (2004) in the case of men, Yang (2008)), an
investment in the migrants’ children when these are taken care of by the origin household of the
migrant (Cox (1987)). Another use of remittances which received a lot of attention, within the NELM
framework, may be insurance (de la Bri` ere et al. (2004) in the case of women, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006), Yang and Choi (2007)). The insurance may partly be seen as a reimbursement
by the migrant to his origin household which helped him ﬁnance migration (Rosenzweig (1988)).
Lastly, transfers may be the result of an altruistic decision (Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) compare
insurance and altruism motives). In this paper, although the focus is on migration, the approach
to transfers is closer to the literature on full insurance. For transfers received, I focus on the
insurance motive through looking at whether transfers received increase in response to negative
income shocks or decrease in response to positive shocks. For transfers sent out, I also have in mind
a dynamic insurance mechanism whereby households may have to share their positive shocks with
other households. A contribution is to examine urban households together with rural households
while most the literature on transfers has focused on rural households (Cox and Jimenez (1998)).
Indeed, since PSF is a national representative survey, I am able to compare the impact of shocks
in urban and rural areas. Presumably, given the high degree of imperfections in African agrarian
labor markets, the possible change in social norms and constraints when individuals move to urban
areas and, more prosaically, the diﬀerences in housing conditions, one may expect diﬀerences between
urban and rural dweller in the way both positive and negative income shocks are shared.
I must stress though that I do not examine particularly the relationship between rural and urban
households. More speciﬁcally, while I will describe migration destinations, comparing movements of
urban and rural households, I do not examine the determinants of the choice of migration destination.
Contrary to the papers I mentioned previously, I do not study the relationship between a migrant and
his original household. I adopt a diﬀerent point of view which does not only encompass migrants
and which comprises all households, my interest lying mainly in whether a given household, not
necessarily of recent migrants, sees changes in his household structure in response to positive shocks.
I do not take the point of view of particular individuals acting as a link between the rural and urban









































1The paper is structured as follows: in section 1, I brieﬂy describe the speciﬁc aspects of the PSF
survey used in this paper; in section 2, I describe positive and negative income shocks declared by the
households and the ways they cope with them. In section 3, I turn to the description of migration
patterns. I examine in particular whether households mention changes in household structure in
response to income shocks. In section 4, I explain the empirical approach to examine the impact
of income shocks on migration and transfers. The main point is to make sure that my measures
of shocks are exogenous. I study, at the individual and households levels, arrivals and departures
of household members during the 2 years preceding the survey. The shocks considered are shocks
mentioned by the household. As I know the causes of the shocks, I can remove any shocks that
may be regarded as endogenous. For instance, I exclude employment shocks which may be in fact
decisions made by the household together with the decision to send a migrant away or to host a new
household member. Section 5 presents the results before concluding.
1 The Data: the PSF Survey
This study is based upon the survey “Pauvret´ e et Structure Familiale” that was conducted between
November 2006 and May 2007 by the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la D´ emographie in
Senegal. The survey was designed and prepared by a team of Senegalese and French researchers. 4
The PSF dataset is nationally representative. The target sample was 1800 households and the
number of usable questionnaires 1785. The sampling is in two stages: ﬁrst a stratiﬁcation in 3
groups: rural, urban excluding Dakar and Dakar that determines the number of enumeration areas
(EAs) in each group, 64 in rural areas, 86 in urban areas. Then, in each enumeration areas, 12
households are randomly selected.
PSF is particularly detailed in terms of household structure, expenditures and transfers. It also
attempts at understanding the sequence of shocks and movements of household members over the
ﬁve years preceding the survey. It does so in diﬀerent sections that ask, separately, about shocks and
movements but also in a section that speciﬁcally enquires into whether household recompositions
occurred after and because of exogenous income shocks. Throughout the descriptive part of this
study, I distinguish whether households speciﬁcally mentioned movements due to shocks or not.
4. Matar Gueye and Momar Sylla from the ANSD on the Senegalese side; Philippe De Vreyer (Universit´ e Paris IX










































12 How Fragile or Volatile Are the Senegalese Households:
Frequency of Shocks and the Ability to Cope with Them
Since my interest lies in understanding whether migrations react to income shocks, I must ﬁrst gain
knowledge of the sources of the shocks. Therefore, I start with a description of the causes of income
ﬂuctuations that households undergo. In the appendix, I also examine households’ responses to
shocks. They are not of indispensable to understand the impact of income shocks on migration but
provide interesting insights into the lives of Senegalese households. As I want to have a comprehensive
picture of the income volatility of Senegalese households, I present both positive and negative income
shocks. Although negative income shocks may be a priority for policy making to protect households
or individuals, positive income shocks also deserve scrutiny as the way households use them may
change their impact in the long run. Moreover, those households that experienced positive shocks
in the ﬁve years before the survey could be similar to those other households who experienced
negative shocks, all being in a broad category of households whose incomes are volatile and who,
therefore, may undertake ex-ante actions to smooth their income. It is important to identify all these
households as the impact of shocks on consumption may be pulled downward for them. What’s more,
the coping mechanisms they use may diﬀer from other households whose income volatility is lower
and who may be hit more hardly by a single shock as they may not be prepared to cope with it.
Throughout the descriptive part of this study, i.e. in this section and the next one, the shocks
presented are declared by households, not measured through estimates. Positive and negative shocks
were recorded following a similar method. I detail here how negative shocks were recorded. First,
a household was asked whether he experienced years particularly bad in terms of income in the
ﬁve years before the survey, i.e. between 2002 and 2006, allowing for a maximum of 3 particularly
bad years. Then, for each year considered particularly bad by the household, he was asked about
the causes. If the household stated a bad harvest, only a limited set of reasons, mostly linked to
weather and other natural conditions, were allowed. While I allowed households to respond other,
survey enumerators were asked to record reasons linked to a loss of income not due to a change in
household behavior but to reasons beyond the household’s control. An overarching goal, in data
collection, was to capture exogenous shocks, except for some speciﬁc responses, such as taking on a
new employment. The latter can hardly be regarded as exogenous or unanticipated and, together
with divorce and house eviction in the case of negative shocks, I will exclude it when I estimate
the impact of shocks on movements. I allowed it among positive shocks in order not to miss, in









































1One may notice that shocks ﬁrst hitting a speciﬁc household member, such as a job loss, are
a possible response. However, the fact that they are mentioned by the household as a cause for a
diﬃcult year, means that the shock in fact aﬀected the whole household. The questionnaire’s section
on shocks was preferably administrated to the head of the household or to another adult household
member, but all household members were encouraged to take part in answering.
The magnitude of shocks is not quantiﬁed. Typically, whether a household lost 20% of its income
or 60% is unknown to us. If both losses are due to the same reason, they will represent exactly the
same thing to us, be it in the descriptive statistics or in estimates. The survey did not quantify
shocks partly because it was heavily detailed in many sections and very diﬀerent from other surveys
and so I did not want to put even more burden on enumerators or households. However, while
quantifying shocks likely brings additional information to a mere dummy measure, what matters
is households’ perception of whether they underwent a diﬃcult year, so long as I restrict their
perception to economic hardships. In order to make sure that shocks as I measure them do capture
economic phenomena, I estimated the impact of shocks on consumption and found strong coeﬃcients
both for positive and negative shocks, with the expected sign in each case.
Lastly, I do not include a distinction along household structure, although household structure is
a focus of the PSF survey. In a basic typology of household structure based on the cohabitation of
wives of the household head, the proportion of urban households with co-habitation is somewhat low,
at 6%. Therefore, separating them would make a small sample. In contrast, cohabitation is prevalent
among 23% of rural households and so diﬀerences in household structure along this criterion seem
to overlap with the basic rural/urban distinction. When it does not, neither the pattern of shocks
nor the way to cope with them seem to vary along household structure.
2.1 Negative Income Shocks
Figure 1 plots the percentage of households that experienced a shock listed underneath at least once
in the ﬁve years preceding the survey. The results are presented separately for urban and rural
households. 5 Over the whole period, 69% of rural households experienced a shock while only 46% of
urban households did and this is mostly explained by the incidence of crop loss and animal disease
or loss, which are obviously much less likely to aﬀect urban households. The incidence of these
shocks is particularly low in Dakar, where crop loss only aﬀected 4% of households while animal









































1loss occurrence is as low as 1%. In urban areas outside of Dakar, animal loss aﬀected 5% of the
households which is a relatively high third of the 15% proportion in rural areas and shows the links
that households in small urban areas can maintain with rural areas. 6 Crop loss is only mentioned by
11% of those households, which is double the Dakar proportion but only one ﬁfth of the proportion
in rural areas. It may be that some urban households outside of Dakar have enough space available
to raise some animals that they sell. 7
Figure 1: Negative income shocks experienced by households, % in rural and urban areas
On the other hand, as one may expect, individuals in urban areas are more likely to lose their
jobs than in rural areas, with a proportion of 8% of households declaring a job loss in the ﬁve years
before the survey, in contrast with 3% in rural areas. Similarly, income shocks due to illness are
also mentioned more often in urban areas. This is especially true of Dakar where 13% of households
declared the illness of a household member while the proportion is 9% in other urban areas and 8%
in rural areas. Unlike job loss, this higher declaration of health shocks in Dakar is probably due
to diﬀerent perceptions of health rather than to actually worse health conditions in Dakar. Indeed,
this pattern is similar to a pattern observed elsewhere in which richer households are more likely
to declare illnesses or declare their health status as being bad. Of course, Dakar is by no means
6. The proportion of households who own cattle, sheep or goats is 13% in Dakar, 26% in urban areas outside of
Dakar and 66% in rural areas.
7. Dakar is a very special urban area. It comprises 4 million inhabitants, a third of the Senegalese population. The
biggest city after Dakar, Thi` es, only encompasses 252,000 inhabitants (Direction de la Pr´ evision et de la Statistique
(2004)). Therefore, economic opportunities are likely to be much higher in Dakar than elsewhere. Because they are
small and immediately surrounded by rural areas, urban areas outside of Dakar may also maintain stronger links with









































1uniformly richer than the rest of Senegal, however, even poorer households there may nurture higher
expectations on health than households in other areas.
In addition to being more likely to be hit at least once by a given shock, rural households are
also more likely to experience a negative shock more than a sole year. While, in Dakar, 70% of
the households who experienced a negative shock did so only once over the ﬁve year period, the
proportion goes down to 45% in rural areas. Mirroring this is the fact that 29% of rural households
had three bad years out of 5 while only 11% of urban households went through such a series of bad
years. Given the diﬀerences uncovered between urban and rural areas, I will continue to examine
them separately throughout most of the paper.
2.2 Positive Income Shocks
Positive shocks are much less frequent than negative ones. They also diﬀer from the latter in that
their incidence is very similar in urban and rural areas: the frequency is 34% for the whole sample,
31% for urban households and 38% for rural households. Albeit signiﬁcant, the diﬀerence is rather
small. Thus, while the likelihood of a positive income shock is half that of a negative income shock
in rural households, it is 2/3 that of a negative income shock in urban areas. I must bear in mind
that the period going from 2002 to 2007 was quite diﬃcult for rural areas, both because of drought
and because of grass-hoppers. Attacks of grass-hoppers occur casually in Senegal but they hit the
country particularly hard in 2004.
The sources of positive income shocks strongly mirror those of negative income shocks, as can be
seen in chart 2. Good harvests and high agricultural prices 8 are almost exclusive to rural households
while, with a probability of 10%, ﬁnding a new job is three times as likely in urban than in rural
areas. 10% of urban households cited a shock that had not been listed in the survey questionnaire
and, as consequence, fell in the “other” category, while they are only 4% in this case in the rural
sector. This may be an indication that I have more diﬃculty capturing the sources of shocks in
urban areas. The only exception to the symmetry between negative and positive shocks is for good
sales, which are cited by more rural than urban households while bad sales were cited equally often
by urban and rural households.
8. Given that most Senegalese agricultural production is either for own-consumption or for exports (cotton,









































1Figure 2: Positive income shocks experiences by households, % in rural and urban areas
3 Migration in Response to Shocks: Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Do Households Declare Changes in Household Structure Because of
Shocks?
This subsection follows the same scheme as the previous one, examining ﬁrst responses to negative
and then positive income shocks in terms of changes in household structure. The latter encompass
migration but also moves within the same community. Although I restrict estimates to movements
with changes in community, it is of interest to have a more general picture of household changes.
3.1.1 Negative income shocks
On average, among households that experienced a negative shock, 16% declared modifying their
structure in response to the shock. What drives up this ﬁgure of 16% is mainly temporary migration
emanating from rural households: 14% of rural households facing a negative shock declare that a
household member undertook temporary migration. The ﬁgure is a mere 3% for urban households.
No deﬁnition of temporary movements was provided to households. However, given that they had
other possible responses of permanent departure of household members and other possible responses
related to taking on a new employment, the item of temporary migration should be clearly under-









































1migration for another purpose. The higher prevalence of temporary migration in rural households
has to be compared with the fact that they are less likely than urban households to declare that
inactive household members took on a job after a negative shock: the ﬁgure is 4% in their case as
against 8% for urban households. So, in the end, rural dwellers do seek income generation schemes
in addition to their usual sources of income, and they actually do so more than urban households,
but they have to send individuals away from the village to ﬁnd these income generation schemes.
Individuals living in urban areas are less in need to move away since they have more opportunities
at home. Anecdotal evidence in Dakar and its suburbs shows that urban dwellers accept to spend
long hours in public transport, with frequent commuting times of more than four hours per day.
Although at a low rate of 3%, temporary migration is the household change in structure most
often cited by urban households which faced negative shocks. Temporary migration for a purpose
other than work is declared by 2% of them while all other re-compositions, which include the de-
parture for good of former household members, the arrival of new household members or, lastly,
the fostering out of children, are cited by fewer than 2% of urban households facing shocks. The
latter two are also mentioned by no more than 2% of rural households. I will probe more into this
when looking at the reasons put forward by parents who fostered their children out or by children
fostered within the households of the PSF sample but it seems that child fostering often responds
either to traditions that may not be particularly linked to shocks or to the need to put a child in
school. If these two reasons dominate, one would expect fostering to be responsive to positive and
not to negative income shocks, if anything. Similarly, although households could try to diminish
their dependence ratio by sending out inactive members, typically the elderly, in hard times, mi-
gration actually often entails costs that credit or liquidity constrained households cannot meet up.
As for other recompositions in rural households, they are slightly higher than in urban households
albeit signiﬁcant in a single case which is a complement to the temporary migration case: permanent
departure of household members looking for work, which is mentioned by 4% of rural households. 9
In the end, although the proportion of households declaring a speciﬁc recomposition is small,
once I add all the alternatives but exclude temporary migration for work, 6% of urban households
undertook an important change in their structure in response to negative shocks and 9% of rural
households did, which is far from being negligible and as high as the proportion of households
receiving transfers from the family, while these recompositions are more radical answers to shocks and
9. The exact phrase is “permanent departure of household members to work”. Although the word “migration”










































1may have very important consequences in terms of the changes of relationships between household
members, former and new.
3.1.2 Positive Income Shocks
I now turn to the comparison of urban and rural areas changes in household structure in response
to positive shocks. As for negative shocks, each permanent re-composition taken separately seems
equally frequent in urban and rural areas. Most responses are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the
two sectors, except for marriage. The marriage of household members after positive shocks stands
at 11% in both regions. However, in urban areas, the household head is slightly more likely than
other household members to marry after a positive shock while, in rural areas, it is mainly household
members other than the household head who marry after a positive shock, as can be seen in ﬁgure 3.
This reﬂects the diﬀerences in marital status and in household size between the two regions. Rural
households comprise on average 1.6 individuals more than urban households and, while 9 out of 10
rural household heads is married, this is true of only 3 in 4 household heads in urban areas. This
diﬀerence may explain why, in rural areas, the extra money spent for a marriage is mostly used by
someone else than the household head.
Figure 3: Household re-compositions after positive income shocks, % in rural and urban areas
All other responses are similar in incidence. Child fostering after a positive shock is mentioned
by the same proportion of households in urban and rural areas, which is an additional proof that









































1fostering and to the entry of new household members, while the departure of household members was
declared by relatively more rural than urban households, its incidence, in response to positive shocks,
is the same in the two areas. The close proportions in the case of positive shocks are probably due
to the fact that these departures necessitate ﬁnancing and are then cases in which the extra money
generated by a positive shock is used to cater for the costs of a movement in its initial months. There
is no reason, a priori, why movements which are indeed investments, such as education or looking for
better employment opportunities, should diﬀer in the two regions. I actually expect rural dwellers
to move more for such reasons as they have fewer opportunities and services available than their
urban counterparts. However, in the context of Senegal, urban youth in particular may contemplate
international migration, which is very costly, more than rural inhabitants. This is conﬁrmed by
the data, as the proportion of individuals who migrated out of Senegal is threefold in urban areas
relative to rural areas. I come back to this when I turn to the general description of migrations.
3.1.3 Diﬀerences in Household Structure Changes in Response to Positive and Nega-
tive Income Shocks
Re-compositions after positive income shocks are much more likely than after negative income shocks.
23% of the households that experienced a positive income shock changed something in their structure
permanently. In the case of negative shocks, the proportion is 9% for rural households and 6% for
urban households, where, again to capture permanent changes, I excluded temporary migration.
Figure 4 displays the diﬀerences between the two types of shocks. It shows, side by side, the
incidence of each response for each group, the one that faced a negative shock at least once and
the one that faced a positive shock at least once. If I restrict the sample to households who faced
both negative and positive income shocks, the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for fostering
and entries, and almost signiﬁcant for departures of former household members. All mentioned
movements are more frequent in response to positive shocks. While I do expect arrivals in the case
of negative shocks to be low, I would expect, if migration was a coping mechanism, departures to
be more responsive to negative shocks than is displayed in ﬁgure 4. This seems to be more true in
rural areas where departures after negative shocks stand at 4% among rural households, which is









































1Figure 4: Household re-composition after negative and positive income shocks
3.2 The Incidence of Migration
From now onto the end of the paper, the move I consider is a change of community, i.e. village
in rural areas and city in urban areas, unless indicated otherwise. 10 This part is more restrictive
than the previous sections in which, except when the explicit term of migration was used for the
departure of former household members, the changes in household structure, for instance through
fostering or marriage, entailed all entries into and departures from the household, not necessarily
from the community.
The total number of individuals who have changed community over the past ﬁve years is 2181,
which amounts to 13% of the 16581 individuals on whom I have information in the sample. These
include current household members who are part of my sample and who entered in the household
during the ﬁve years before the survey but also former household members on whom information
10. Dakar, despite its signiﬁcant size, is a single community. When collecting the data, I allowed the registration
of a change in community when individuals came from parts of Dakar that are very far apart but, examining their
characteristics, in particular the occupation of the household head in their former household and their former occu-
pation, I do not ﬁnd diﬀerences. In particular they do not seem to conduct more agrarian activities, which is what I
would expect if they were living in the outskirts of Dakar. In addition, there is likely to be heterogeneity in responses,
with individuals moving similarly between two communes of Dakar giving diﬀerent responses depending on how they
perceive their move. So, in order to have a clear cut sample of movers, all individuals moving within Dakar are not
deﬁned as migrants. All the results presented in the paper, both descriptive statistics and estimates, are quantitatively









































1was collected. I cannot describe their movements together though and the description of mobility
has to split migrants between individuals who entered the sampled households and individuals who
left them. Firstly for the sake of clarity but also because the number of movers out of the households
is underestimated in the survey and cannot be compared to the number of members arriving in the
household. Therefore, before turning to a detailed description of migration, the next subsection
assesses the extent to which some movers are missing.
3.2.1 Underestimation of Departures
There are 1414 individuals who have entered in the surveyed household in the ﬁve years before the
survey, coming from a diﬀerent community. The number of individuals who left the households in
the same period and who changed community is 708. 11 Since the sample is representative of Senegal,
the numbers of individuals leaving the households and entering them should be much closer than
this and I rather expect the number of individuals leaving to be higher, since they include migrants
outside of Senegal. This section aims at decomposing the gap to identify the groups for whom the
discrepancies are smaller.
The ﬁrst part of the gap between those two groups is due to a lack in the survey: households were
not surveyed about former household members under 25 who are not children of current household
members. Indeed, the number of new household members, i.e. individuals who entered in the
sampled households during the ﬁve years before the survey and coming from a diﬀerent community,
who are under 25 and with no parent in the household they came from is 223, which is 32% of the
gap between arrivals and departures.
The rest of the gap, 478 individuals, is due to deﬁciencies in household recall of former members.
Among adults 25 or older, 540 arrived in the household while households mentioned only 250 former
adult members, which is another 41% of the total gap. Among children under 24 who left leaving
at least one parent in the household, their counterparts in arrivals being children under 25 with
at least one parent alive outside of the surveyed household, the gap is of 125 (651 arrival and 526
departures), which is 18% of the total gap. The fact that the recall bias is much higher for adults
above 25 than for children under 24 of household members is not surprising. I do expect individuals
to remember their children better than more distant relatives.










































1Adding up the three subgroups with discrepancies between the numbers of arrivals and depar-
tures, I reach a 91% explanation of the gap. Of course, I do not expect the total number of arrivals
and departures to be exactly equal and, as a consequence, the 91% ﬁgure seems satisfying.
It is not possible to estimate the extent of the recall bias for each household. While, since the
sample is representative of Senegal, I expect the aggregate ﬁgures of departures and arrivals to be
close, there is no reason why a speciﬁc household should witness the same number of departures and
arrivals. Indeed, the whole point of this study is, in a way, to see what sorts of households tend to
host or send away individuals, in particular in terms of the shocks they face.
So, I cannot explain speciﬁcally why a speciﬁc household has a high recall bias or why a given
individual is forgotten, unlike in the classic case of an attrition bias in a panel data where I could run
estimates coding to 1 individuals missing in a round of the panel and examine their characteristics.
However, just as I saw, by comparing their aggregate numbers in arrivals and departures, that
children of household members were forgotten less than other former household members, I can
compare the aggregate movements of some categories and see those for whom the gap is wider. I do
not want to give the detailed ﬁgures but only to give a better idea of the recall bias. First, urban
areas are the ones where the recall bias is the highest. Moreover, individuals who move to rural
areas, whether they come from urban or rural areas, are also more likely to be forgotten. In terms of
the reasons for moving, individuals moving for marriage are under-represented in departures while
individuals who moved because they found a job are over-represented. Lastly, in rural areas and
urban areas outside of Dakar, women are under-represented in departures. Crossing the previous
aspects a group comes up as under-represented: women marrying out in rural areas. And indeed,
the number of such women who moved in is 141 while the number who moved out is only 38. The
gap is very high even for children of household members, as only 23 of them are declared as leaving
while, out of the 141 who moved in, 92 women under 24 with at least one parent outside of the
household, joined a rural household because of marriage.
It is diﬃcult to know whether the movements which are under-represented are more or less linked
to shocks. For now, I can only speculate, but if movers to rural areas increase after negative income
shocks in the sending household and if those movers are forgotten by their sending households, then
I may greatly underestimate the impact of negative shocks on departures. As a matter of fact, we
will show the impact of shocks on departures for the whole selected sample of movers but also for









































13.2.2 The Incidence of Migration
Given the underestimation I explained in the previous section and, more particularly, the fact that
it is higher for women and in urban areas, I focus on arrivals during the 5 years before the survey to
describe the basic characteristics of movers and the households that host them. I restrict the sample
to households created before 2003 as I do not want to add reasons speciﬁc to the creation of a new
household.
The aim of this section is to quantify migration across gender, age and sector of residence and to
understand the motivations mentioned by movers. I pay particular attention to whether movers de-
clared moving because of diﬃculties in their household of origin and examine the relative frequency
of movements which may be considered as investments for the individual, such as education, with
movements that may less be regarded as investments, for instance divorce. This section is comple-
mentary to the previous sections where I focused, at the household level, on movements explicitly
viewed as responses to shocks. In addition, it provides us with individuals’ stated motivations to
move, which I will then compare with the results of estimates.
Among those households, 8.0% of current members changed community in the ﬁve years before
the survey. The number is exactly the same for urban and rural areas, while, within urban areas,
Dakar in fact attracts fewer newcomers than other cities, with proportions of 7.5% and 8.8%.
The age proﬁle of movers is also as expected, with the proportion of new entrants having an
inverted U-shape proﬁle, increasing from 6.4% to 13.6% between children between 0 and 14 and the
group who is most likely to move for all the expected reasons (education, work and marriage), the
15-24 year-olds. The individuals between 25 and 54 also bear a proportion of newcomers which is
higher than the sample average, at 9.9% while those above 55 are the least likely to move, with a
proportion of 4% recent movers, which amounts to only 52 individuals.
The main motivations for movements are displayed in table 1. Movers are split in 3 age-groups
and, for each group, between males and females as the motivations for migration are highly hetero-
geneous.
Facing a “Diﬃcult situation in origin household” ranks third in explaining children movements
and, at 11.7%, accounts only for a low proportion of movements when compared with the fact
that more than a quarter of children move because they follow their relatives while another quarter









































1because of a diﬃculty faced by their parents or their original household. If I add these to those
non-fostered children who entered the household in the ﬁve years before the survey, I ﬁnd that
20.5% of the children who came in the household did so because of some diﬃculty. 12 So, in the end,
despite not being mentioned by households to explain departures of their former members, children
arriving in the surveyed households do mention leaving their original household because of a diﬃcult
situation. On the other hand, the typical movement which is due to an investment, education, is
mentioned less often for this age-group of 0-14. If I add-up the children who mention fostering
because of education to non fostered children who entered the household also because of education,
the proportion is 13.5%. This latter motivation is mentioned as often for boys as for girls, as are
most other motivations, except for the diﬃcult situation in origin household which is twice as likely
to be mentioned by boys as by girls.
The comparison of male and female prime age adults brings a diﬀerent picture to the comparison
among children. While movements due to diﬃcult situations are very low, both among men and
women, there is much more heterogeneity when it comes to other migration motives. Males move
because of fostering or education almost three times as often as girls. This mirrors the fact that
female school enrollment decreases sharply in the transition to secondary education. 13 In line with
this, I see that boys moving for education are also more likely to come from a rural area than boys
moving for other reasons.
In fact, for women between 15 and 54, the main motivation to migration is marriage, accounting
for more than 50% of their movements, while the ﬁgure is a tiny 1.5% for men. 14 Symmetrically
to marriage, as divorced women generally return to their parents’ households, I see that 6.02% of
women between 25 and 54 moved because of a divorce while the proportion is a tiny 0.54% for
men. In fact, while 71.6% of female newcomers are married, only 44.3% of male newcomers are.
In contrast, men move much more because of employment. A total of 24.19% of men between
15 and 24 entered a household because they were looking for a job or had found one. These two
12. Diﬃculties group illness, diﬃcult economic situation in the household of origin, illness or death of a parent or
divorce or separation of the parents.
13. In my sample, while the proportions following formal educations are the same for 6 to 14 year-old boys and
girls, the proportion of boys between 15 and 20 who are still in school stands at 44.1%, which is almost 50% higher
than girls’ 30.4% proportion still in school. Thus, the inequality in education between boys and girls translates into
more movements for education in the case of boys than girls, to allow this further education to take place.
14. Moving for marriage splits into two reasons. While the women who mention“marriage”as the reason for entering
the household moved in with their husband immediately after the wedding, the women who mention that they“joined
their husband’s household” did not reside with their husband in the aftermath of marriage and joined his household









































1reasons are mentioned by 43.78% of men between 25 and 54 while only 3.61% of the women in this
age category moved because of work. The proportion among younger women is much higher, at
11.06% but, without examining the employment history of older women, I cannot tell whether this
higher proportion bears evidence of higher employment participation in the younger generations of
Senegalese or whether the diﬀerence is due to life-cycle work decisions.
The heterogeneity in the motivations for arrivals between the urban and rural sectors is signiﬁcant
mainly for the group of individuals aged between 15 and 24, for which I also display the diﬀerences
in motivations in table 1. For children, the only diﬀerence is in education, which stands at 14.06%
in urban areas, almost three times the 5.20% proportion in rural areas. Somewhat mirroring this is
also a diﬀerence, for adults between 25 and 54, in the motives linked to employment. While 33% of
movers to urban areas do so for employment reason, the ﬁgure is only 14% among movers to rural
areas. For prime-age adults, the contrast in the education motive is even stronger, as chances for
moving for education purposes is almost fourfold for those moving to urban areas. Urban households
are also much more likely to host individuals looking for a job (3 times as much as rural households),
moving because of a diﬃcult situation in their original household or fostered young adults (more
than twice as much as rural households in the two latter cases). Excluding individuals returning
to their original household, which is a motivation diﬃcult to interpret, the main motivation for
movement to rural areas, is marriage, mentioned more than three times more often than in urban
areas. The proportion of individuals aged between 15 and 24 and who are married is indeed much









































1Age 0 to 14 Age 15 to 24 Age 25 to 54
Male Female Male Female Rural Urban Male Female
Move with a relation 24.64 25.77 0.00 1.70 1.27 1.00 1.08 1.20
Fostering 23.91 28.83 12.10 3.83 3.80 8.96 1.08 0.60
Education 8.70 9.20 29.84 10.64 6.96 25.37 2.70 3.01
Diﬃcult situation in origin household 15.22 7.36 5.65 2.98 1.90 5.47 3.24 10.24
Marriage 0.00 0.61 0.00 17.02 16.46 6.97 1.62 19.88
Join Spouse’s households 2.17 1.23 0.00 33.19 37.97 8.96 0.54 29.52
Divorce 0.72 0.00 0.81 1.28 1.27 1.00 0.54 6.02
Job search 2.17 0.00 16.13 6.38 4.43 13.93 21.62 3.01
Job found 0.72 0.61 8.06 4.68 3.16 7.96 22.16 0.60
Back in origin household 10.87 9.20 15.32 8.09 12.66 8.96 20.54 7.83
Creation of the household 1.45 1.84 1.61 0.85 0.63 1.49 7.57 3.01
N Obs 138 163 124 235 158 201 185 166
NOTES - 911 new household members who migrated over the 5 years before the survey, out of 14039 current members
of households created before 2003. Separate ﬁgures for the urban and rural sector are displayed only for the 15-24
year-olds because they are close for children, except for education motives, and similar for the 25-54 year-olds.
Table 1: Motivations for Movements of New Household Members, %
Location of Migrants Bearing in mind the recall bias already discussed, I must now turn to
departures from the interviewed households to examine migration destinations and, in particular,
international migration. In table 2, I show the results both for the whole sample of movers and
for the sub-sample of movers for whom I expect the recall bias to be low, namely the children of
household members who are under 24 and the children of the household head, regardless of their
age. In fact, the size of the sub-sample that I expect to be under-represented is rather small, with 96
individuals only. But the diﬀerences in their places of migration are quite striking when compared
to the sub-sample for which the recall bias is low. 31.2% of the sub-sample with biased recall moved
abroad while only 12.8% of the unbiased sub-sample left Senegal. It may be that individuals with
at least one parent alive in Senegal are more reluctant to leave their country or they may just be
younger on average with international migration coming later in life. However, it also seems quite
plausible that individuals who go to a foreign place are less forgotten because they may play an
important economic role in their original household. In any case, I cannot say very much about this









































1When I split the unbiased sample between urban and rural households, I see that rural households
are three times less likely to have a former member abroad than their urban counterparts. Regarding
migrations within Africa, the proportion is only halved between urban and rural households. Since
Senegal has borders with ﬁve countries and since the areas close to most frontiers are densely
populated, this is not surprising. Overall, rural migrants’ movements are 10 percentage points lower
than urban movements, in terms of international migration as well as internal migration to cities;
they are, on the other hand, almost twice as likely to migrate to another rural area, than are urban
individuals likely to move to a rural area. More surprising is the fact that the proportions of men and
women, respectively, migrating abroad, are very close, with 12.6% for men and 12.9% for women.
The proportions between men and women are also very close if I distinguish migrations within and
outside of Africa.
All movers Movers’ sample with better recall Movers’ sample with better recall
Origin HH urban Origin HH rural
Dakar 23.45 24.51 27.52 22.32
Other city 28.67 29.01 30.23 28.24
Other village 31.21 33.50 22.09 41.81
Other African country 6.92 5.56 7.75 3.95
Other non African country 8.33 7.19 12.40 3.39
Unknown 1.41 0.16 0.00 0.28
N Obs 708 612 354 258
Table 2: Migration Destinations of Former Household Members, %
Overall, if I separate the motivations to move into three main reasons: those simply due to the
life-cycle, such as marriage, those due to education or work, and those due to diﬃculties, the major
observations are as follows. The main reasons for the movements of prime-age and adult women
are linked to marriage or divorce while the major reasons for the movements of men in the same
age-groups are linked to employment or education. As a bride-price and patrilocality are prevalent
in Senegal, both hosting a bride and a member looking for work may be driven by positive income
shocks in the hosting household. So, albeit marriage may entail a higher upfront cost than hosting
a new member for another reason, there may not be strong diﬀerences in responsiveness to positive
income shocks between prime-age or adult men and women. In terms of responsiveness to negative









































1as likely for women as they are for men. The reverse is true for children, for whom boys’movements
due to diﬃculties in the household of origin are twice as likely as girls’. Prime-age adult males also
display higher movements due to negative shocks than females in the same age-group, although this
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant at 10%.
4 Migration and Transfers in Response to Shocks: Empirical
Approach
4.1 Migration
The descriptive statistics I have conducted bear evidence of a rather weak link between negative
income shocks and mobility. Hosting new members after experiencing a positive shock seems more
likely. In addition, while there are important diﬀerences between the urban and rural sectors in terms
of the motivations to move, diﬀerences between the two sectors in terms of recomposition after income
shocks seem rather limited. Descriptive statistics only allow to draw limited conclusions, though.
First for a technical reason, since they only allow for univariate analysis. But more importantly,
the descriptive statistics I have shown above were on the movements viewed by the household as
being responses to income shocks. In this section, by conducting estimates of the impact of shocks
on the probability of moving, I am able to estimate the impact of positive and negative income
shocks on actual individual movements holding constant other characteristics that may also be
correlated with movements. I do not have income data covering the ﬁve years before the survey
but I have the employment history of household members. Thus, using retrospective answers, I
attempt at capturing the household’s economic situation at the time of the move by controlling for
the household head’s occupation in the year before movements took place. I estimate the impact of
shocks experienced by a household in the years 2004 and 2005, on migration in 2005 and 2006.
The estimations are conducted both at the individual level and the household level. Although I
expect close, or at least not contradictory, results between the two sets of estimates, each of them
uncovers a diﬀerent aspect of migration. For individuals, the question is whether they are more likely
to go to or leave households where shocks happened. Moreover, besides shocks, I am interested in
examining which individual characteristics are correlated with mobility in particular sex, economic
status and ties with the households. It is unclear how I would aggregate this information at the









































1after a shock or to send a member away after a negative shock. If migration decisions are taken in
a diﬀerent way by an individual and a household, the impact of shocks may diﬀer depending on the
unit of observation.
For arrivals, I estimate the probability that current household members joined the household
in the years 2005 or 2006 and, in the case of households, that they hosted at least a new member
in 2005 or 2006, after a shock in 2004 or 2005. For departures, I estimate the probability that
individuals who were household members in 2003 left the household in 2005 or 2006. Similarly,
for households, I examine whether they sent at least one member away after a shock. I restrict
the sample of individuals to those who were born before 2003 as I do not want to mix decisions
on childbearing with movement decisions. Besides, we restrict the sample to households that were
created before 2004 because I mainly want to examine how households already formed react to
shocks. I do not want to mix the study with the motives for creation or dissolution of households.
An additional and more practical reason for this restriction to households created before 2004 is
that the meaning of shocks occurring in 2004 would be unclear for them. In particular, they may
be shocks aﬀecting one of the household members in his former household, if the survey question
was not understood correctly. 15 I consider shocks in 2004 and 2005 because, in the next section, I
examine the impact of shocks on the other mechanism through which a household’s network may be
impacted by the household’s events: transfers. As PSF collected information on transfers over the
12 months preceding the survey, i.e. essentially in 2006, I also focus on arrivals in a close period but
add arrivals in 2005 to increase the power of my estimates.
I estimate separately arrivals and departures. But, for both, I focus on the characteristics of the
sampled households. This means that, for arrivals, I focus on the characteristics of the households
in which new members enter while, for departures, I focus on the characteristics of households that
send away members. 16
I consider that an individual i has a latent propensity to move, which depends on income shocks
in the household h that he enters in or leaves, the individual’s own characteristics Xi and household
15. The proportion of those declaring a positive shock in 2004 or 2005 is similar for households created before and
after 2004. The same is true of negative shocks.
16. While the PSF survey collected some information on households that individuals came from or went to but no

















































i4Xh + i (1)
where k denotes either an arrival or a departure.
I adopt a probit model: the i are assumed to be identically and normally distributed, independent
between households but not necessarily within households: the standard errors allow for intra-
household correlation. I do not observe the latent propensity Move05/06*
i. Instead, I only observe
whether individuals actually moved.
Movek,05/06
i = 1 if Movek,05/06*
i ≥ 0
Movek,05/06
i = 0 if Movek,05/06*
i < 0
Similarly, households change their structure, either through departures of old household members









where k denotes either that the change was the arrival of new household members or departure
of former household members. I also only observe the actual change ChangeMembersk,05/06
h which
is equal to 1 if ChangeMembers05/06*
h ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
The measure of negative shocks I use is a dummy variable equal to one if the household underwent
at least one negative shock in 2004 or 2005. A negative shock is one of the shocks presented in the
descriptive section, with the exception of divorce and eviction, since they may be both anticipated
and due to household behavior. Thus, negative shocks included are bad harvest, animal loss or
illness, lack of clients, land loss, death, job loss, illness and“other”reasons that the PSF survey had
not pre-coded. I come back to this after mentioning positive shocks. A parallel measure of positive
shocks is used from which I removed the positive shock on employment as it is not an unanticipated









































1sources of positive income shocks allowed in the estimation are therefore good harvests, good sales,
inheritance, high agricultural prices and“other”reasons not pre-coded in PSF. Including shocks for
reasons not pre-coded is not very satisfactory since one may worry that some of these reasons may
not be exogenous. However, in urban households, positive shocks due to“other”reasons are equally
important as “good sales” and “new job” and excluding them would make the occurrence of shocks
too low. I explain below robustness checks I conduct partly to make sure that the “other” response
does not capture an unobserved variable linked to household optimism and hospitality.
Thus, since I remove positive employment shocks, the shocks I measure should neither be antic-
ipated by the household nor be due to a household eﬀort to generate income in order to host new
members or send members away.
However, some shocks may only happen if households conduct certain activities and larger house-
holds are more likely to be hit by shocks when the shocks I measure are originally individual level
shocks. Since I want to make sure that our measures of the shocks do not capture unobserved
household characteristics (typically, I have seen that negative shocks are much more likely in rural
than in urban households), I control for two broad sets of household characteristics. First, I control
for household demographic composition, i.e. the number of individuals in the household before the
shock, in age-groups 0-5, 6-14, 15-24, 25-54 and older than 55, typically to make sure that shocks
such as illness or death are not simply due to diﬀerences in the presence of older individuals in the
households. Besides, I control for the occupation of the household head in 2003 and for land pos-
sessed to make sure that shocks on agriculture or sales do not capture the fact of conducting these
activities. The household head’s occupation, amount of land possessed and, an additional control
– the education of the household head – are also proxies for household long-term income. I do not
control for income directly as I only have it in the year of the survey and not before new household
members joined. In particular for farming households, it would be very diﬃcult to disentangle the
contribution of new household members to income. More crucially, given household decision leeway
in occupational choice and work intensity, income is likely to be determined together with household
willingness to host new members. Ideally, we would like to instrument income using income shocks
and then examine the impact of instrumented income on changes in household composition. This
will be possible if the PSF survey is carried out again to form a panel of individuals.
Moreover, given that I allowed for the reason “other” in positive shocks which is the item men-
tioned most often by urban households together with “new job” and “good sales”, I want to make









































1members. As a consequence, I conduct robustness checks through including the whole set of shocks
between 2002 and 2006 to make sure that what matters is indeed the sequence or, more precisely,
that arrivals in 2005 and 2006 are more likely in households that experienced shocks in 2004 or 2005
and not in households that mentioned a shock at any point in time.
In addition to the controls necessary to make sure that the shocks are not correlated to unobserved
household characteristics, another set of control variables measures the strength of the links between
individuals and their households and help us understand which factors favor departure from or arrival
in the household. I control for whether individuals have a parent in the household and for whether
they are married to someone in the household. I interact some of these controls with the sex of the
individuals because I expect women to move more because of marriage. I also check whether the
fact of having a parent in the household has a speciﬁc impact for children. The other individual
level variables I include are the work status and the education of individuals, along with sex and age
dummies. I pay particular attention to the latter two as I interact them with income shocks and
urban status to understand fully which groups are sensitive to shocks.
A last set of controls is region ﬁxed eﬀects. In robustness checks on the results, I control for
regional diﬀerences potentially aﬀecting both shocks and arrivals. For instance, regions with cash
crop cultivation may both pull people in general as they may oﬀer agricultural work and also face
more shocks as cash crops such as cotton are water intensive and more sensitive to drought. If
household level shocks and arrivals are both due to regional factors, then we must control for them
as I want to capture household-level shocks. 17 That said, given the possible small variation in
movements within a region and the fact that my sample is not very big, I must be weary of outliers
and, thus, must not consider the speciﬁcations with regional ﬁxed eﬀects as the best necessarily, but
regard them as additional sensitivity analysis.
Sample Size. Table 13 in the appendix presents summary statistics for all the variables used in
the estimation for the sample examined. For arrivals, given that I examine households created earlier
than 2004 and individuals born before 2004, the number of observations for individual-level estimates
should be 12206 current household members. 18 However, missing observations reduce the sample
to 9628 individuals. The number of missing values is particularly high because I use retrospective
17. The name of the regions in French is d´ epartement. There are 29 regional clusters in rural areas and 20 in urban
areas.
18. a less conservative number would be 12348 if I do not cross check with restricting the sample to households with









































1information to capture the household and individual situation in 2003, before the shocks occurred.
The year of entrance into the household is missing for 145 individuals. When this information is not
available, I am unable to compute household composition before shocks occurred, i.e. in 2003. As
most of the 145 individuals are in diﬀerent households, I lose information on the 1774 individuals
who live in the same households as them. In addition to this, information on work status in 2003
is missing for 390 individuals and information on the presence of parents or spouses is also missing
for 599 individuals. In the estimates, I will conduct robustness checks examining samples with
fewer explanatory variables to make sure that the results are not driven by the sample for which no
information is missing.
In the end, since the sampled households are representative of Senegal, comparing the impact
of household and individual characteristics on departures and on arrivals will give us a better un-
derstanding of pull and push factors in explaining migration. In fact, despite the caveat on recall
bias discussed earlier, my understanding of push factors will be more comprehensive than of pull
factors, in the case of individuals. To truly assess pull factors, I would need to observe all potential
migration destinations of a given individual and compare the one he ﬁnally chose to the other des-
tinations. Although I do not have this information and cannot compare the relative importance of
pull factors between all possible destinations, I will see whether individuals are more likely to move
to households that experienced shocks. At the household level, the interpretation of pull factors is
more straightforward as I compare households that host new members to households that do not
and I will be able to tell whether certain characteristics, and in particular shocks, drive households
to bring in new members.
4.2 The Impact of Shocks on Transfers
Theoretically, a household has two ways to grasp part of a positive shock on another household:
either receive transfers from it or send it individuals. Symmetrically, a household can obtain help
from another household mainly through receiving remittances or sending him dependents. Along
with my study of movements, I examine whether income shocks also impact transfers sent and
received by individuals and households.
I carry a large study that covers all individuals, regardless of whether they can be considered
as migrants, i.e., I also include individuals that never changed residence, and I see whether the









































1not restrict the individuals entering or leaving a given household to be close relatives of household
members, I do not restrict transfers to transfers sent to or received from individuals who are more
likely to be in the origin household, e.g. the parents.
As transfers have already been studied widely, I examine them only to complete the picture of
household economic events in relationship with his external private network, where a network is
deﬁned very broadly and loosely as all the individuals who are not household members and who
know a household member. I view shocks and movements in two separate parts: transfers sent by
the household and arrivals in the household, in particular after positive shocks, on the one hand;
movements out of the household and transfers received by the household on the other hand. I have
already explained why I want to compare the impact of shocks on arrivals and transfers sent out,
since these are the two means through which a household’s network may beneﬁt from the household’s
positive shocks. Symmetrically, for a given household, receiving transfers and sending individuals
are the two ways through which he can beneﬁt from external resources.
The PSF survey did not collect net transfers but collected, for each household member, the
transfers he sent separately from the transfers he received. I estimate them separately also because
the networks helping and being helped may be diﬀerent. In a classic informal insurance framework,
one would expect these two networks to overlap for the insurance to be viable and for enforcement
to take place. Network members would have to help in a given period in order to get help in a later
period. However, with income and occupational mobility, individuals changing location or job may
join new networks that help them in hard times while at the same time keeping strong links with
their network of origin. Individuals may still send transfers to their network of origin for aims other





















































1transfers (42% and 88% respectively), I want to correct for the fact that the distribution of transfers
has a large mass at 0. Moreover, individuals or households sending transfers may in fact want to
send negative transfers. For these two reasons, I allow estimation with a censored tobit model.
For transfers received, it is less obvious why I would allow censoring on economic grounds, unless
transfers received create obligations for households to send transfers in a later period. However, given
also a large mass at 0, I estimate them with a censored model. Lastly, I allow for intra-household
correlation of the ui and vi.
In terms of speciﬁcation, some explanatory variables diﬀer from the speciﬁcations for movements:
because transfers are measured in the twelve months before the survey, i.e. in a period starting be-
tween December 2005 and March 2006, depending on the month of interview, I control for household
characteristics in 2006 and not in 2003. However, to follow a similar methodology as for departures,
I restrict observations to individuals who were household members in 2004, i.e. before the shocks
occurred. Doing so allows not to mix the impact of shocks on arrivals and the possibly diﬀerent
behavior of new members with respect to transfers sent.
5 Results
5.1 Migration
5.1.1 Household-Level Results: Arrivals and Departures
The results for arrivals and departures at the household level are in table 3. For departures, I must
be cautious since I cannot restrict the estimates to samples for which recall bias may be small. I
only show the results for departures in order to compare with individual level estimates and to have
a reference when I examine transfers received by the household in response to shocks, in the next
section. I ﬁnd no impact of income shocks with these household-level estimates, in either area. In
addition, mainly household demographic characteristics seem to aﬀect movements. I will come back
to this and compare the variables impacting movements with the variables impacting transfers at
the household level. At this stage, it seems that movements may necessitate a more disaggregated









































15.1.2 Individual-Level Results: Arrivals
Average Impact, Fostering and Marriage
Positive and negative income shocks impact arrivals but in a heterogeneous way, across age, sex
and residential sector. On average, they do not seem to have an impact, as can be seen in column
(1) of table 6, as well as in the more parsimonious speciﬁcation of column (2). It is important to
notice that the point estimate in column (2), for positive shocks, is less than a third that in column
(1), so I will have to be careful in checking the robustness of the results.
In columns (3) and (4) of table 6, I focus on groups for whom I expect shocks to have a speciﬁc
impact. First, I expect children whose parents are outside the household to be more likely to enter the
household after positive shocks. Column (3) shows that children without parents in the household
are more likely to enter the household than children with their parents in, and in particular children
of the household head. However, they are not more likely to enter after positive shocks. In fact,
positive shocks seem to attract exclusively children of household members. 19 I return to examining
the arrivals of children later.
Given two other traditions, patrilocality and bride price, I also expect a woman whose husband
lives in the household to be more likely to move in after positive income shocks. As seen with
descriptive statistics, movers may be recent brides or women married for a while but who had been
staying away from their husband, which I expect to be due to ﬁnancial constraints, including housing
problems. First, even without shocks, women with husbands in the households should be more likely
to move in. In fact, the fact of having a husband in the household does not come up as signiﬁcant. 20
In addition, in column (4), women married in the household do not seem to be more likely to arrive
after positive shocks. Neither do they seem less likely to enter after negative shocks. So it does not
seem that positive shocks are used to pay the bride price or to bring the bride in the household.
In fact, only females not married with someone in the household seem more likely to enter the
19. The coeﬃcient on the interaction of positive shocks with the fact of being a child is positive and signiﬁcant.
Its sum with the coeﬃcient on positive shocks is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, indicating more entries for children of
household members after positive shocks. The coeﬃcient on the interaction with having no parents in the household
is of the same magnitude but opposite sign and the total eﬀect of positive shocks for children with no parent in the
household is 0
20. In addition, while 93% of the women who are married with a household member have no parent in the household
and so, for most of them, calculating their likelihood of moving in necessitates taking into account the high 0.179
coeﬃcient that applies to individuals without parents in the household, the sum with the dummy equal to one for









































1household after positive income shocks. 21 I will come back to this later. As for individuals married
in the household, the only signiﬁcant impact of shocks is that negative shocks decrease the entry
of males with a wife in the household. This eﬀect seems mainly to capture the return or entry of
close relations to the household. 98% of the males married in the household are direct relations to
the head. In addition, 20% of men married in the household and who did not live in the household
continuously since birth mention that the household is their “usual place of residence” or that they
returned to their original household. So, negative shocks seem to delay the entry or return of close
relations. It is worth noting though that the results hold when the head of the household and his
children are excluded from estimates.
Looking at the other explanatory variables at the household level, the only signiﬁcant ones
are linked to household composition. In particular, whether the household head went to school
or whether he was working in 2003 do not seem to matter. Nor did his occupation matter in
speciﬁcations not shown here. Likewise, individuals more educated or working do not seem more
likely to enter the household. I also interacted the fact of working in 2003 with age and sex dummies
and none of the interactions were signiﬁcant. However, current enrollment matters. Being enrolled
in school is negatively correlated with entering the household in 2005 and 2006. Of course, this is
not a causal relationship since obviously current enrollment and movements are likely to be jointly
determined but this correlation would go in the sense of Akresh (2008) who ﬁnds that fostered
children are less likely to be enrolled in school than other children in the households that host them.
The Heterogenous Impact of Shocks
In table 5, I disaggregate the impact of income shocks across sex, age and sector of residence to
see whether the relatively limited impact of shocks I found is due to heterogeneity across groups. So
far, negative shocks decrease the arrival of men only, married in the household, and positive shocks
seem to have an impact only on females not married with someone in the household.
In the descriptive section, shocks seemed to have a more pervasive impact. 14% of the households
that underwent positive income shocks declared welcoming, as a consequence, either a fostered
child, a new spouse or an individual other than a spouse. Given that 30% of individuals who enter
households do so without changing community, the changes due to shocks mentioned by households
may be those not linked to migration. However, when I conduct estimates coding to 1 all recent
entries, even when they did not imply migration, the results are unchanged. Another possible










































1explanation for the limited impact of shocks in the estimates, compared to households’ replies, could
be the inclusion of explanatory variables. However, only a few of them are signiﬁcant and I have
seen that removing the controls seems to make the impact of positive shocks weaker. The fact that
work and education outside of enrollment bear non signiﬁcant coeﬃcients also seems to contradict
the results of the descriptive statistics where many movements, in particular of prime-age adults and
adults, were linked to work and education. 22 However, for the 15-24 year-olds, I have also seen that
the motivations to migrate diﬀer strongly between movers to urban and to rural areas. I explore the
heterogeneity of the impact of income shocks and of some other key variables in the next two tables
where I examine urban-rural diﬀerences across age and gender. So far, estimations for the urban
dummy are in line with descriptive statistics: urban areas do not seem to draw higher migration
than rural areas.
Column (1) of table 5 examines diﬀerences in the impact of shocks along sector of residence,
while columns (2) and (3) add interactions of urban status with age dummies, for males and females
respectively. They both exclude individuals above 54 because, as they are only a few and mostly do
not move, studying the responsiveness of their movements to shocks would make little sense. The
sub-group aﬀected by shocks would be too small to examine seriously any reaction to them through
migration. 23 I display results separately for males and females to allow for an easy reading of the
table, all the more as some explanatory variables other than shocks have diﬀerent impacts for each
gender. This table has slightly more parsimonious speciﬁcation than table 6. 24 Columns (4) to
(9) display robustness checks of the results of columns (2) and (3), with even more parsimonious
speciﬁcations and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
The estimates display tremendous heterogeneity. In urban areas, only male movements are
responsive to shocks while shocks seem to mostly impact female movements in rural areas. Urban
households which faced negative income shocks are less likely to host males of age 0-14 while this
is not true of rural households. The decrease in entry seems more likely to aﬀect the 0-14 year-olds
who are the children of the household head. When the household did not undergo negative income
22. This does not seem to be due to lack of variability in the explanatory variables as, for instance, for men, only
50% of those aged between 15 and 24 work. The ﬁgures are 71% in rural areas and 38% in urban areas
23. The biggest subgroup in this age category is the one of 241 rural older females who is also the group moving
most, with a rate of 2.4% and a non signiﬁcant diﬀerence between households facing positive or negative shocks or no
shocks. I must stress that, in this group, there are only 54 individuals with positive shocks
24. I have grouped the 3 variables of household head, spouse and child of the household head as they had very close
coeﬃcients in the estimates of table 6 and I have dropped the variables on the presence of a spouse in the household
as I return to it in table 6. As this variable is missing for 144 observations, removing it increases the number of









































1shocks, the 0-14 year-olds entering in 2005 or 2006 are, at 20%, children of the household head while
there are 0 such children when the household underwent negative shocks. However, the sample is
small, with 46 and 10 observations respectively. To increase the sample size, I compare individuals
moving in households which underwent a negative shock at any time between 2002 and 2006 with
individuals moving in households that did not. Those households that witnessed shocks have fewer
children of the head coming after negative shocks. However, they also have a higher number of
grand-children entering.
Adult males, between 25 and 54, are more likely to enter urban households which experienced
positive income shocks. 25 In terms of relationship to the household head, men moving in the 5
years before the survey to urban households do not diﬀer depending on whether the household
experienced a positive shock (there are 36 and 99 observations respectively). There is one diﬀerence
in the motivation to move however: movements into households that experienced positive income
shocks seem more likely to be related to employment, 40% vs. 30% respectively. I also ﬁnd that
they were more likely to be working before entering the households, compared to those not arriving
after positive shocks as well as compared to those not moving. The respective ﬁgures are 84, 67 and
60%. On average however, whether someone is working in 2003 does not seem to increase entries, be
it for individuals in urban or in rural households. At the time of the survey, the proportion working
is almost the same for all three groups, still at 84% for movers after positive shocks, as in 2003, at
80% for movers not after positive shocks and non movers. An additional important information is
that those arriving after positive shocks are not more likely to come from rural areas.
In rural households, arrivals are strongly responsive to positive shocks in the case of girls and adult
women. I cannot detect any diﬀerence between adult females entering rural households depending
on whether they did so after positive shocks or not, in terms of relationship to the household head,
the fact of having their husband living in the household or having their children with them. I will
return to female children in table 6.
Be it in urban or rural areas, for males or for females, adults of age 15-24 are not responsive
to pull shocks when moving. And yet, they are the group for whom movements are likely to be
investments, in education or to ﬁnd work. I will examine in the next section whether they are more
responsive to push factors, positive or negative. An interesting result however is that females in this
25. Although the speciﬁc interaction of positive shocks with being aged between 25 and 54 and living in an urban
area is not signiﬁcant, the sum of the coeﬃcients on positive income shocks for urban males in this age group, i.e.
the sum of the coeﬃcients on positive shocks, positive shocks in urban areas and both the latter interacted with the









































1age group are more likely to move to urban households than to rural households.
I ran all the regressions of table 5 examining the impact of shocks only for recent movers, i.e.
individuals who entered the households within the past 10 years. The results of table 5 are conﬁrmed.
Explanatory variables other than shocks also bear heterogeneous impacts. Being enrolled in
school is negatively correlated with arrivals in rural areas both for males and females. The correlation
looks much stronger for males but, for them, it is nil in urban areas, hinting towards their fostering
to urban areas precisely for education, as seen in the descriptive statistics. In results not shown
here, I obtain a complementary result when examining work at the time of the survey: prime-age
adult males working are more likely to enter rural households while this correlation is zero in urban
households, also hinting towards possible movements speciﬁcally for schooling. Movers to urban
areas are also less likely to work in 2003. However, contrary to current work where the correlation
was only true of males, this correlation is only true for girls and prime-age adult females.
Marriage and Fostering In Urban and Rural Areas
Since I ﬁnd that girls and adult women are more likely to move to rural households after positive
income shocks while, in urban areas, boys are less likely to enter after negative income shocks and
adult males more likely to enter after positive income shocks, I return to the estimates for fostering
and marriage, presented in table 6, and run them again separating the urban and rural sectors.
Table 6 displays the results, for the sample restricted to individuals older than 54. Columns (1) and
(2) are equivalent to column (4) of table 6, with column (1) displaying the results for entries in rural
households and column (2) displaying the results in urban households. Starting from column (4), I
focus on fostering. Columns (3) and (4) are equivalent to column (3) of table 6, for the rural and
urban sectors respectively and columns (5) to (7) present additional results on children.
For fostered children and married women, shocks play no role whatsoever in urban areas. The
negative impact of negative shocks on the entry of boys in urban households that I saw in table 5
seems to be diluted once I add interactions of shocks with the presence of the parents.
The results of table 6 seem to hold for the rural sector. The lesser entry of adult males in
households hit by negative shocks is conﬁrmed. In rural areas, the proportion of men entering the
household in 2005 or 2006 and mentioning that they returned to their original household is very
high, at almost 50% and so this may explain why they are more sensitive to negative shocks than









































1As for children, I ﬁnd, as in table 6 that those more likely to enter a rural household after a
positive income shock are children with a parent in the household, as can be seen in column (3). In
results not shown here, it seems that the correlations are stronger for children entering with other
individuals in the household (although I do get into small samples with these estimates). However,
columns (5) to (7) show that the impact of positive shocks holds mostly for girls, conﬁrming previous
results. 26 And, in fact, for them the impact of positive shocks is the same in magnitude whether
they have a parent residing in the household or not. The only diﬀerence is the precision of the
estimated impact. 27 The results are unchanged if I remove controls for household size.
Lastly, the mothers moving in without positive income shocks are more likely to be the wives
of the household head while, after positive income shocks, they are more likely to be his daughters
or daughters-in-law. This leads to an over-representation of grand-children among girls entering the
household after positive income shocks, with ﬁgures of 37% and 16%. I conﬁrm this in column (8)
where I include an interaction between positive shocks and dummies for female grand-children. The
impact of positive shocks only holds for female grandchildren. 28
Besides grand-daughters, the proportion of girls who are “other relations” or have no family ties
to the household head doubles in households which experienced positive income shocks. It is 31%
for them versus 14% in households with no positive income shocks. This may be a hint towards
girls coming in perhaps to help with domestic work and free adults to work in the ﬁelds or work
themselves on the ﬁeld in case of a positive shock on land (either land available for cultivation
through inheritance or productivity shocks due to rainfall). However, in estimations not shown here,
I did not ﬁnd a speciﬁc impact for cultivator households and so it is diﬃcult to draw a conclusion on
the activities of these girls. An interesting ﬁnding, looking at descriptive statistics, is that, among
the 0-14 year-olds, the proportion of girls is the same in households which experienced positive shocks
and in households which did not. So, positive shocks seem to be used to equilibrate the numbers of
boys and girls, and the movements of girls may be more sensitive to liquidity constraints than those
of boys.
26. In column (5) the χ2 test on the joint signiﬁcance of positive shocks for girls between 0 and 14 is signiﬁcant at
1%.
27. When no parent lives in the household, the test on the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients is only signiﬁcant at
12% but the magnitude of the sum of the partial eﬀects (not show here) is very close to the partial eﬀects for girls
with their parents in.
28. The test of joint signiﬁcance of positive income shocks for female grand-children is signiﬁcant at 1% and the










































1Summary of Results on Arrivals
Overall, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the urban and rural sectors. Urban areas do not
attract, on average, more individuals than rural areas. However, the composition of the ﬂows is very
diﬀerent in the two sectors and it also diﬀers sizably along income shocks. Urban households with
positive income shocks attract mainly adult males, moving for employment reasons. It is important
to mention, in addition, that these males are not more likely to come from rural areas. On the
other hand, in rural areas, I mainly see females, adults and children, moving in after positive shocks.
They are partly adult females moving with their daughters and partly girls moving alone. Negative
shocks decrease entries of boys in urban households and of adult males married with a household
member in rural areas. The adult males are close relations to the household head. Among the
boys less likely join urban households after negative shocks, the children of the household head seem
over-represented, although the evidence is inconclusive given that I have small samples. So, negative
shocks do seem to decrease relatively more arrivals of individuals close to the household while one
may have expected the contrary. Households somewhat seem to have little control really on whom
enters in them, except for close relations. Contrary to what I was expecting, urban households are
not less connected to non close relations than rural households.
5.1.3 Individual Level Results: Departures
Now that I have looked at the impact of shocks on individual arrivals thoroughly, I turn to their
impact on departures from the household. The PSF survey did not interview the households on
former household members under 25 who are not children of a household member. In addition,
given that households tend to forget, when interviewed, some former household members, I conduct
the estimates of departures using mainly the sub-samples for which the recall bias is the lowest. As
the sub-samples are smaller and by deﬁnition restricted to some categories, I am not able to test as
many speciﬁcations for departures as for arrivals. As women are forgotten more than males, it is
diﬃcult to estimate their departures. One thing I am unable to do because of the recall bias, is to
see whether, in a symmetry with positive shocks, young girls leave rural households in response to
negative shocks, as they are typically forgotten by their households. Similarly, adult female children
of the household head seem to be forgotten too. In rural areas, they are only a few and problems of
recall seem acute for them: there are only 86 of them who have left a rural household in 2005 or 2006
while there are 150 females who are the children of their origin household head, coming from rural









































1is less than 2%.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 7 display the results respectively for arrivals and departures for
the whole sample, while columns (3) to (9) focus on adult children of the household head on whom
information was collected and for whom recall bias is lower. Table 8 focuses on children under 24
of household members. The speciﬁcation is slightly diﬀerent from that for arrivals as I do not have
labor history for former household members and so do not control for work status in 2003.
Average Impact and Adult Children of the Household Head
The ﬁrst notable result in table 7 is that, while the coeﬃcient on the female dummy is signiﬁcant
and negative in the whole sample estimates of column (2), it is no longer signiﬁcant in other columns
for departures (columns (4) to (6)) and is not signiﬁcant either in table 8. What I have already
discussed on recall bias is conﬁrmed in estimates: while, looking at the whole sample, one may have
the impression that females move less than males, I see, looking at the sub-samples where recall bias
is lower, that, in fact, they are as likely to move as males. Women seem to be forgotten more than
males by their former households.
The results in table 7 point towards a responsiveness of departures to negative income shocks.
This result is weak on average, partly because standard errors are large, but seems to hold for urban
males. For the whole sample, the positive impact of negative shocks on departures is not robust to
the speciﬁcation of column (5). In column (6), the interactions with urban status are not signiﬁcant
either. Starting from column (7), I focus on males, who are less likely to be forgotten, and ﬁnd
consistently that urban males are more likely to move after a negative shock. 29 The magnitudes of
the partial eﬀects vary considerably though, at 5.8 in column (7), 14.5 in column (8) and a huge
23.4 in column (9) which controls for region ﬁxed eﬀects, so I must be careful with the quantitative
result.
In terms of other explanatory variables, the ﬁrst result one may notice is the strong and negative
coeﬃcient on the urban dummy. However, given that the coeﬃcient on the fact of not conducting
agrarian activities is of opposite sign and close magnitude, out-migration is not lower in urban
areas than in rural areas. 30. If I restrict the sample to rural areas, the negative coeﬃcient on not
29. Although the speciﬁc interaction of negative shocks with urban status is not signiﬁcant in column (7), the total
impact of negative shocks, i.e. adding the dummy on negative shocks is signiﬁcant at 1%.
30. Despite not being systematically signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient on the fact of not conducting agrarian activities









































1conducting agrarian activities is signiﬁcant. 31 At the same time, male children of the household
head seem to be more likely to leave households that comprise prime-age adults and adults. Putting
together the latter results with results on non agrarian households may hint to surplus labor.
For the sample of arrivals mirroring that of departures, I examine individuals who have at least
one parent outside of the household, with the additional restriction of being the child of the head
of their original household, for those who arrived in the 5 years before the survey. Positive shocks
increase arrivals for them. However, there is no speciﬁc impact for males in urban areas (we replicated
column (9) for arrivals and did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact). So it seems that adult males entering
urban households after positive shocks are not predominantly children of the head of their original
household.
Children Under 25 of All Household Members
The sample of table 8 is restricted, in estimating departures, to children under 25 of current
household members. The mirror sample for arrivals, in columns (1) and (3), is the group of individ-
uals who have at least one parent alive outside of the household. 32 While I do not ﬁnd any impact
of shocks on arrivals, shocks do impact departures, with prime-age adults more likely to change
community after a negative shock. 33 This result holds when controls for household composition
are excluded, as in column (7). Columns (5) and (6) examine whether there are speciﬁc impacts of
shocks for urban households or females and no such things emerge, except for a possible positive
impact of positive shocks on the departures of prime-age rural males. However, this impact seems
limited, as can be seen in columns (8) and (9).
In contrast to adult males of the household head, children of household members are less likely to
leave households which do not conduct agrarian activities. 34 This result holds if I (quite imperfectly)
31. I must bear in mind though, that, in this sample, there are only 53 individuals residing or coming from rural
households not conducting agrarian activities.
32. The exact sample mirroring the sample on departures would be the sample of children who come from a household
where at least one of their parents was residing. However, deﬁning the sample in this way would restrict it to actual
movers. Moreover, this information was only collected from individuals who entered the households in the ﬁve years
before the survey and, even for them, it is missing in 25% of the cases.
33. Prime-age adults in this case are aged 15 to 21 in 2003, since the information I have is on children being under
24 at the time of the survey, in 2006.
34. This result seems driven by prime-age adult children who are not children of the household head. If I restrict
the sample to children of the household head, the point estimate is still negative but much smaller and not signiﬁcant.
So, it seems that children of household members other than the household head are more likely to leave household









































1attempt to control household income through including non food expenditures in the year of the
survey. Therefore, agrarian activities do not seem to be capturing income. I cannot think of a
particular interpretation for this result for which I must be careful anyway, given that only 58
rural households for this sample of prime-age adult rural children do not conduct agrarian activity.
Another contrast with adult children of the household head is that the young children of household
members are more likely to leave households where there are fewer prime-age adults.
Summary of Results on Departures
To sum up, contrary to arrivals in the household, which are both responsive to positive and
negative income shocks, departures seem to be only responsive to negative shocks. Also in contrast
with arrivals, children out-migration is not sensitive to shocks. I have examined the movements
of adults who are close to the household: the children of the household head and the children of
household members. I examined, in a regression not shown here, whether the 25-54 adult males
not children of the household head are more likely to leave urban households after negative shocks.
I cannot examine them seriously because they are typically in the category of the forgotten, all
the more as urban households tend to forget household members more than rural households. But
I expected them to be possibly pushed away by the household in hard times. I do not ﬁnd any
impact of negative shocks for them. In fact, I ﬁnd that they are likely to leave rural households
after negative shocks but not urban households. I do not ﬁnd that they leave after positive shocks
either. It is diﬃcult to infer whether moving away after negative shocks is a protection or not. The
fact that young children do not leave after negative shocks may hint towards the fact that staying
is a protection but I cannot be sure of this given that preferences unrelated to risk management
may be at play in this decision too. Lastly, while I have seen that prime-age children of household
members may move after positive shocks, I have been unable to capture this result more precisely.
While I would like to verify this through examining international migration, which is more costly
and thus possibly more responsive to positive income shocks, the proportion and absolute numbers
of people moving abroad over the sole years of 2005 and 2006 are too small to allow for any worthy
investigation.
5.1.4 Additional Robustness Checks
As discussed previously, shocks as I measure them are designed to capture unanticipated changes









































1shocks and receive new household members, shocks would be capturing the eﬀect of an unobserved
variable of optimism and hospitality. To make sure that shocks do not capture unobserved char-
acteristics, I control declarations of shocks by the household in additional years and I verify that
arrivals in the years I measure are impacted by the shocks in the years that precede them. I repeat
the estimates in columns (2) and (3) of table 5 adding, to the set of explanatory variables, shocks
in 2002, 2003 and 2006. I group shocks in 2002 and 2003 as I do for shocks in 2004 and 2005. The
results are displayed in table 9. They are similar to those of table 5. While the coeﬃcient on the
interaction of the 25-54 males and negative income shocks is signiﬁcant, contrary to table 5, the
impact of negative shocks for this group of adult rural males is in fact also not signiﬁcant.
Summary of Results on Migration
In the end, I do ﬁnd the expected impact of negative shocks on departures. Children of household
members between 15 and 24 leave their households after negative income shocks, both in urban and
rural areas. On the other hand, male adult children of the household head only leave urban areas
after negative shocks. The contribution of this paper is to examine the impact of positive shocks. I
ﬁnd sizable impacts and very diﬀerent results in urban and rural households. While rural households
host females, children and adults after positive shocks, urban households only host adult males after
positive shocks. In an exact opposite picture, negative shocks decrease entries of boys in urban
households while they decrease entries of adult married males in rural households.
5.2 Transfers
5.2.1 Household-Level Results
Table 10 shows the estimates at the household level for transfers sent (columns (1) to (5)) and
received (columns (6) to (9)). For transfers sent, the impact of positive shocks shows up quite
clearly, both in terms of total household transfers and in terms of transfers given per household
member above 15. Moreover, the positive impact of positive shocks is true of urban and rural
households. Negative shocks seem to decrease transfers given but the impact is only signiﬁcant
for total household transfers, in column (1). As for transfers received, no coeﬃcient on shocks is
signiﬁcant.
Comparing the characteristics displayed in tables 10 and 3, very few variables seem to impact









































1characteristics of the household which are correlated with movements, with more movements in
households with 15-24 year-olds and more departures in households with children and adults. For
transfers, a diﬀerent group plays a role: comprising household members older than 55 increases
transfers received and decreases transfers given. Besides demographic variables, the fact of conduct-
ing agrarian activities is the only variable signiﬁcant for movements, only for departures in fact as
households conducting agrarian activities are more likely to see departures. Households conducting
agrarian activities are both less likely to send and receive transfers and this holds true if I restrict
the sample to rural households. Most other explanatory variables seem to matter only in the case of
transfers. Households whose head has some education are more likely to receive transfers, although
this is oﬀset when the head of the household works. The latter variable has a positive impact on
transfers given in urban areas. Lastly, as can be expected, households headed by females receive
more transfers and send fewer transfers.
5.2.2 Individual-Level Results
The results on the impact of shocks on transfers sent by household members are in table 11. In column
(1), estimates are conducted on the whole sample while the rest of the table restricts estimates to
household members older than 15. Only 2.73% of household members under 15 send out transfers
and the estimates of columns (1) and (2) are quite close.
On average, income shocks do not seem to impact transfers sent. Similarly to movements, the
impact of income shocks on transfers sent seems to be heterogeneous. However, the impact varies
more across gender than along sector of residence. In column (2), the coeﬃcients on the interactions
with urban status are not signiﬁcant. In terms of gender diﬀerences, a ﬁrst important result is
that women send larger transfers than men. In addition, column (3) shows that positive shocks only
increase transfers given by males while negative shocks only decrease transfers given by females. The
coeﬃcient on the interaction between the female dummy and positive shocks is equal, in absolute
value, to half the coeﬃcient on the female dummy. These results are robust to excluding controls
for household size and to including region ﬁxed eﬀects, in regressions not displayed here.
For males, the impact of positive shocks seems homogenous across age and sector of residence
and is only weaker when interactions with age dummies or sector of residence are included, in column
(4). Besides, I ﬁnd that negative income shocks decrease transfers given by older urban males. In









































1age group. More surprisingly, rural females in this age group also decrease transfers given after
positive income shocks. I examined whether this result depended on whether the household hosted
new members in 2005 and 2006, thinking of a possible substitution between transfers and arrivals,
and in fact found that the decrease in transfers given is only true of households who did not receive
new members. On the other hand, I also ﬁnd that positive shocks increase transfers sent by older
rural females, above 55, as can be seen in column (5), and this holds whether the household hosted
new members or not. One possible explanation would be that older females in rural households are
in charge of distributing the beneﬁts of positive income shocks to the outside world. Positive shocks
would then only be distributed outside by them, causing adult females to give smaller amounts. In
fact, the negative impact of positive shocks for adult females only holds when they do not reside
with older individuals and so my hypothesis does not seem true. The estimates also hold in the
robustness checks of (6) to (9).
Lastly, in column (10), I restrict estimates to males and interact positive shocks with the fact
of having at least a spouse in the household. The coeﬃcient on this interaction is negative and
its sum with the coeﬃcient on positive shocks is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In another
speciﬁcation, I restricted the sample to married men and the results held too. Furthermore, if I
do a similar regression but interact positive shocks with the fact of being married, the results are
qualitatively the same but quantitatively slightly weaker. It so seems that single males are more
likely to send transfers after positive shocks and that, among married men, those whose wives do
not live in the same household, are also more likely to send transfers after positive shocks.
Turning to transfers received, in table 12, the impact of income shocks seems weak. Columns
(3), (4) and (5) may point towards a positive impact of negative income shocks on transfers received
by males. However, the standard errors are large and estimates imprecise. I have excluded prime
age adult males together with children because they receive very few transfers, in particular in rural
areas. For females, the impact of negative shocks is overall indistinct, except for older rural females
for whom transfers received decrease after negative income shocks. Albeit with a somewhat large
standard error, making it signiﬁcant only at 10%, this surprising eﬀect is robust to the speciﬁcations
of columns (9) and (10). Positive shocks do not have any impact on transfers received. In particular,
they do not decrease them.
As a summary, shocks impact mainly males in the expected way: positive shocks increase transfers
sent out by males, and particularly males who are single or whose wife does not reside in their









































1females, negative shocks decrease transfers sent and positive shocks increase transfers given by rural
females. In addition, I ﬁnd two unexpected impacts. Adult rural females aged between 25 and
54 decrease the amounts of transfers they give when they undergo positive shocks and older rural
females receive fewer transfers after negative income shocks. These results are only true for women
and hold with regional dummies that capture aggregate shocks. Thus, they do not seem to be driven
by highly correlated shocks in rural areas, whereby adult females would decrease the transfers they
give after positive shocks because the whole village may face a positive shock. In fact, these results
almost hold even when I include village ﬁxed-eﬀects. At the household level, only positive shocks
seem to have a robust impact, increasing transfers sent after positive shocks. So, overall, transfers
received do not seem to increase with negative income shocks, except perhaps in the case of adult
males. Households do not seem to receive much help in a pecuniary way. Negative shocks only allow
older rural females to decrease the amount of transfers they give.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the impact of income shocks on migration and transfers. I have
examined arrivals in households and departures from them as well transfers sent and received. In
contrast, most previous studies focus on migration as a departure from a household of origin and
potential subsequent remittances sent by the migrant. Alternatively, former studies have focused on
particular groups, for instance fostered children or the movements of women at the time of marriage.
I have adopted a broad approach, allowing for heterogeneous impact of shocks along age, sex and
sector of residence. my approach is partly motivated by anecdotal evidence on households hosting
new members regularly, including adult members, and changing structure. I have completed my
analysis of movements with an examination of the impact of income shocks on transfers to have a
comprehensive view of a household’s relationships with other households, given that migration and
transfers are the two main ways through which a household can receive help or provide support to
other households.
In my analysis, I have paid particular attention to diﬀerences between the urban and rural sectors
as labor markets function very diﬀerently in the two sectors, with predominant independent farms
and absent labor markets in rural areas. In addition, urban areas oﬀer infrastructures, such as
schools, which may make them more attractive to some groups.









































1The impacts are very heterogenous. In terms of arrivals in the household, there is a clear contrast
between urban and rural areas, with adult males moving to urban households which faced positive
shocks while positive shocks in rural areas bring in adult females and young girls. Contrary to what
one might expect, urban households do not necessarily seem more detached from their networks than
rural households. In terms of relationship to the household head, the adult males hosted after positive
income shocks are not diﬀerent from those not hosted after positive income shocks. They seem to be
young active males looking for a job. Positive shocks may allow to ﬁnance their movements, which
may also be an investment to take advantage of economies of scale in housing consumption. Another
interpretation would be that households have more diﬃculty keeping relations away after positive
shocks. In rural households, the females entering are a mix of close relations to the household head
and less close relations. Adult females entering rural households after positive shocks are less likely
to be the wife of the household head than adult females joining households that did not experience
positive shocks. Yet, they are close relations to the household head, most likely his daughter or
daughter-in-law. The girls, under 14 are split between close relations to the household head, for
instance his grand-daughters, or girls with less close relations or no family relation.
Therefore, rural households do seem to use a good part of positive income shocks to bring in
close relations. Somewhat symmetrically to this, rural households also seem less likely to see former
male members return when they face negative income shocks. In urban areas, negative shocks only
decrease entries of boys. It is interesting to see that positive shocks do not bring in adult males
in rural households. This result deserves further investigation, related to the role of women in
agriculture in Africa (Jacoby (1995)). As for departures, the expected role of negative shocks in
spurring them is conﬁrmed for prime-age adults both in urban and rural households and for adult
children of the household head, in urban households. Positive shocks do not impact departures.
While one might consider the 15-24 year-olds as the group for whom movements may be invest-
ments (for work or for education), they are a little responsive to shocks. They receive very few
transfers and their only movement is that of departure after negative shocks. Movements that are
investments may imply a cost that is too high to be impacted by short-term shocks. Long-term
factors may play a more important role in the movements of this age group. In particular, males
currently enrolled in school are less likely to join rural households while this is not the case in ur-
ban households. For females, current enrollment, if anything, decreases the likelihood to enter the
household in both areas.









































1are similar, the results of this paper bear important consequences for the design of public policies.
Identical policies for urban and rural areas, for instance targeting young girls, may entail very
diﬀerent consequences. One may expect the arrival of adult males (in the case of urban areas) and
of adult females and girls (in the case of rural areas) to have diﬀerent consequences in terms of
competition for and reallocation of resources. An extension of this work, going into more detailed
examination of intra-household outcomes, would be to link movements with shocks aﬀecting speciﬁc
sub-groups in the household. In addition, if a second wave of the PSF survey is carried out, I will be
able to examine the welfare impacts of these changes in household structure on the household and
its sub-groups.
Transfers show much less contrast between urban and rural areas but a great contrast between
males and females. Adult males increase transfers sent after positive income shocks and receive more
transfers after negative income shocks, whether they reside in urban or rural areas. For females,
insurance is only manifest through the decrease in transfers given by older rural females after negative
income shocks. They do not seem to receive direct help after negative shocks, and this is despite the
fact that they both receive and send more transfers than males. This may deserve more scrutiny
possibly using the insights of the anthropological literature on norms for expenditures, which may
also have implications in terms of transfers. In another paper (De Vreyer et al. (2009)), I examine
who beneﬁts from transfers received by a household member: whether it is only the household
member and his closest relations in the household or whether the whole household may beneﬁt.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
PosShock04/05 0.032 0.026 -.051 0.04
(0.105) (0.14) (0.113) (0.145)
NegShock04/05 -.025 -.014 0.125 0.123
(0.088) (0.118) (0.092) (0.123)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Urban 0.017 -.237
(0.212) (0.235)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Urban -.025 0.016
(0.176) (0.185)
HHHeadFemale 0.132 0.134 0.137 0.129
(0.098) (0.098) (0.108) (0.108)
HHHeadSchool 0.055 0.055 0.111 0.106
(0.089) (0.089) (0.096) (0.096)
HHHeadWorking03 -.130 -.129 -.006 -.011
(0.151) (0.151) (0.161) (0.162)
HHHeadWorking03 ∗ Urban -.023 -.024 0.094 0.102
(0.186) (0.186) (0.203) (0.204)
Urban 0.127 0.132 0.007 0.035
(0.186) (0.196) (0.209) (0.219)






















HHNumber5503 0.058 0.058 -.038 -.039
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)






N. Obs. 1466 1466 1466 1466
χ
2-stat. 124.538 124.565 64.72 65.766
Pseudo-R
2 0.084 0.084 0.054 0.054








































1(1) (2) (3) (4)
PosShock04/05 0.125 0.042 -.116 -.049
(0.098) (0.085) (0.159) (0.142)
NegShock04/05 -.096 -.096 -.094 -.0009
(0.083) (0.068) (0.082) (0.115)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH 0.225
(0.187)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH ∗ Age01403 -.712
(0.283)
∗∗
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 0.527
(0.175)
∗∗∗
PosShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH 0.021
(0.216)
PosShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH ∗ F -.206
(0.288)
NegShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH -.657
(0.246)
∗∗∗
NegShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH ∗ F 0.551
(0.284)
∗
PosShock04/05 ∗ F 0.379
(0.169)
∗∗
NegShock04/05 ∗ F -.033
(0.145)












SpouseinHH 0.056 0.066 0.23
(0.123) (0.124) (0.14)
∗
SpouseinHH ∗ Female -.102 -.101 -.204
(0.153) (0.152) (0.179)









Female -.063 -.025 -.067 -.131
(0.069) (0.052) (0.069) (0.091)
School 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078)





Working03 -.096 -.089 -.096
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
HHHeadSchool -.036 0.037 -.034 -.041
(0.077) (0.067) (0.076) (0.076)
HHHeadWorking03 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
Urban 0.052 -.002 0.052 0.048
(0.098) (0.068) (0.099) (0.098)
NotAgrarianHH -.017 -.018 -.005
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108)





HHNumber61403 -.017 -.016 -.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)










HHNumber5503 -.011 -.014 -.015
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)







2-stat. 341.433 233.625 328.18 362.66
Pseudo-R
2 0.141 0.091 0.144 0.146
N. Obs. 9628 11978 9628 9628
NOTES - Additional controls: Age dummies for the 0-14, 15-24 and 2554 year-olds.








































1All Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)






NegShock04/05 -.098 0.105 -.162 0.155 -.229 0.086 -.145 0.168 -.175
(0.105) (0.185) (0.17) (0.19) (0.162) (0.173) (0.162) (0.182) (0.152)


















NegShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 -.513 0.139 -.699 0.14 -.398 0.128 -.566 0.117
(0.316) (0.24) (0.335)
∗∗ (0.24) (0.297) (0.229) (0.31)
∗ (0.231)












PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 -.184 -.287 -.281 -.254 -.177 -.156 -.247 -.129
(0.262) (0.226) (0.281) (0.244) (0.251) (0.211) (0.272) (0.228)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 -.215 0.043 -.349 0.039 -.229 0.028 -.370 -.015
(0.244) (0.231) (0.274) (0.233) (0.236) (0.221) (0.27) (0.217)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 0.632 0.603 0.796 0.699 0.407 0.452 0.527 0.481
(0.437) (0.563) (0.467)
∗ (0.587) (0.422) (0.543) (0.45) (0.564)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 0.406 0.042 0.435 0.119 0.376 -.068 0.445 0.03
(0.454) (0.403) (0.48) (0.404) (0.416) (0.377) (0.444) (0.376)









Age152403 0.827 0.413 -.171 0.607 -.157 0.497 -.101 0.647 -.111
(0.145)
∗∗∗ (0.36) (0.235) (0.378) (0.242) (0.337) (0.225) (0.341)
∗ (0.231)












School 0.062 -.052 0.136 -.107 0.093 -.136 0.098 -.212 0.048
(0.078) (0.118) (0.098) (0.12) (0.101) (0.115) (0.094) (0.114)
∗ (0.096)

















Urban 0.129 -.360 -.531 -.505 -.718 -.440 -.688 -.442 -.888




Working03 0.046 -.071 0.038 -.067 -.018 -.138 0.027 -.119 -.089
(0.084) (0.231) (0.179) (0.224) (0.197) (0.229) (0.165) (0.22) (0.177)
Working03 ∗ Urban -.304 -.715 -.905 -.537 -.851 -.371 -.920 -.374 -.800
(0.119)
∗∗ (0.563) (0.529)
∗ (0.554) (0.55) (0.452) (0.512)
∗ (0.426) (0.53)
Working03 ∗ Age152403 -.011 0.437 -.259 0.404 -.150 0.483 -.346 0.46
(0.327) (0.277) (0.346) (0.296) (0.315) (0.256)
∗ (0.328) (0.276)
∗
Working03 ∗ Age152403 ∗ Urban 0.456 0.032 0.498 0.052 0.222 0.0001 0.383 0.007
(0.632) (0.61) (0.643) (0.638) (0.538) (0.575) (0.528) (0.597)
Working03 ∗ Age255403 -.033 -.413 -.170 -.562 -.076 -.363 -.225 -.487
(0.339) (0.27) (0.351) (0.287)
∗ (0.327) (0.252) (0.33) (0.265)
∗






NotAgrarianHH -.013 -.087 0.115 0.061 0.107 -.096 0.081 0.079 0.088
(0.108) (0.132) (0.146) (0.161) (0.172) (0.123) (0.129) (0.148) (0.149)
Regions FE NO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Controls for HH size YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
χ
2-stat. 337.753 215.021 297.142 323.905 462.771 225.424 328.183 343.845 462.178
Pseudo-R
2 0.138 0.167 0.177 0.216 0.212 0.172 0.165 0.221 0.203
N. Obs. 9772 4190 4685 3867 4426 4788 5338 4548 5222
NOTES - Additional controls: Age Dummies for the 2554 year-olds, female (in column(1)), Presence of the parents in the
HH and its interaction with Age 0-14 and urban status, HH head or spouse or child, Female HH head, HH head working in
2003 and educated.









































1Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
All Males Females All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PosShock04/05 -.146 0.235 -.201 -.016 -.233 -.204 -.115 -.259
(0.201) (0.175) (0.212) (0.275) (0.265) (0.263) (0.375) (0.164)
NegShock04/05 0.062 -.144 -.124 0.177 -.110 -.164 -.074 -.100
(0.163) (0.151) (0.17) (0.207) (0.114) (0.138) (0.141) (0.11)
PosShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH 0.024 0.004
(0.294) (0.316)
PosShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH ∗ Female -.310 0.116
(0.379) (0.508)
NegShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH -.818 -.125
(0.303)
∗∗∗ (0.422)
NegShock04/05 ∗ SpouseinHH ∗ Female 0.71 -.022
(0.376)
∗ (0.37)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH 0.239 0.271 0.122 0.013 0.259
(0.255) (0.321) (0.402) (0.371) (0.404)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH ∗ Age01403 -.736 -.301 -.715 -.580 -.727
(0.376)
∗ (0.48) (0.538) (0.525) (0.523)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 0.747 0.127 0.363 0.379 0.988
(0.218)
∗∗∗ (0.387) (0.288) (0.285) (0.373)
∗∗∗
NegShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH -.012 -.228
(0.212) (0.251)
NegShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH ∗ Age01403 0.355 -.166
(0.342) (0.386)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 -.076 -.175
(0.235) (0.291)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH ∗ F 0.075
(0.601)
PosShock04/05 ∗ NoParentInHH ∗ Age01403 ∗ F -.022
(0.73)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 ∗ F 0.551
(0.463)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Female 0.631 -.378 0.158 0.512
(0.224)
∗∗∗ (0.321) (0.475) (0.194)
∗∗∗
NegShock04/05 ∗ Female -.123 0.236
(0.21) (0.199)
PosShock04/05 ∗ HHHeadGdChild ∗ Female 0.182
(0.459)
PosShock04/05 ∗ HHHeadGdChild 0.757
(0.444)
∗











SpouseinHH ∗ Female -.157 -.158 -.010 -.177 0.337 0.084
(0.22) (0.198) (0.167) (0.161) (0.23) (0.172)
NoParentInHH 0.17 0.129 0.103 0.053 0.296 0.295 -.028 0.167
(0.132) (0.14) (0.179) (0.138) (0.213) (0.215) (0.218) (0.13)
Female -.203 -.024 -.082 0.034 -.342 -.324
(0.167) (0.095) (0.107) (0.083) (0.225) (0.124)
∗∗∗
Age01403 -.229 0.003 -.426 -.032 -.593 -.295 0.123 0.272
(0.151) (0.173) (0.205)
∗∗ (0.167) (0.219)
∗∗∗ (0.393) (0.343) (0.234)























N. Obs. 4369 4506 4369 5327 4369 2226 2554 4780
χ
2-stat. 245.797 212.196 191.853 271.262 278.493 121.343 210.968 231.43
Pseudo-R
2 0.155 0.176 0.151 0.208 0.163 0.189 0.182 0.162
NOTES - Additional controls: Dummies for work status in 2003, current school enrollment and the household not conducting
agrarian activities.








































1All Children Older than 25 of HH Head
Males Males Males
Arrivals Departures Arrivals Departures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PosShock04/05 0.116 -.030 0.318 0.255 0.005 0.277 0.475 -.095 0.104
(0.089) (0.097) (0.184)
∗ (0.289) (0.242) (0.385) (0.415) (0.369) (0.44)
NegShock04/05 -.076 0.083 -.112 0.511 0.326 0.418 0.444 -.114 -.598
(0.076) (0.08) (0.172) (0.284)
∗ (0.236) (0.368) (0.437) (0.386) (0.407)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Urban -.036 -.199 -.028 -.122
(0.49) (0.656) (0.576) (0.816)




Female -.012 -.175 -.493 -.049 -.240 -.049
(0.053) (0.06)
∗∗∗ (0.156)
∗∗∗ (0.195) (0.193) (0.194)
School -.161 0.084 -.179 -.003 -.082 -.030 0.311 0.031 0.225
(0.066)
∗∗ (0.085) (0.216) (0.242) (0.203) (0.242) (0.324) (0.244) (0.302)
HHHeadFemale 0.18 0.165 0.173 -.067 -.164 -.086 -.377 -.321 -.557
(0.084)
∗∗ (0.093)
∗ (0.193) (0.287) (0.232) (0.287) (0.417) (0.294) (0.32)
∗
HHHeadSchool 0.033 -.038 0.15 0.411 0.284 0.408 0.009 -.017 0.345
(0.071) (0.088) (0.195) (0.247)
∗ (0.231) (0.246)
∗ (0.314) (0.276) (0.363)
HHHeadWorking03 0.052 -.008 0.579 -.075 -.155 -.084 -.405 -.287 0.149
(0.11) (0.128) (0.31)
∗ (0.338) (0.319) (0.34) (0.399) (0.363) (0.412)
HHHeadWorking03 ∗ Urban -.068 0.048 -.680 -.445 -.264 -.493 -.154 -.087 -.914
(0.135) (0.165) (0.378)
∗ (0.469) (0.429) (0.452) (0.554) (0.488) (0.539)
∗
Urban 0.093 -.039 0.564 -.877 -.498 -.995 -1.553 -.789 -.573





NotAgrarianHH 0.036 -.152 -.009 0.706 0.303 0.699 1.049 0.383 0.99





HHNumber0503 0.023 -.038 0.026 -.161 -.165 -.422
(0.017) (0.024) (0.049) (0.112) (0.114) (0.127)
∗∗∗
HHNumber61403 -.024 0.019 0.013 0.017 0.02 0.058
(0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053)




∗ (0.05) (0.049) (0.063)
∗
HHNumber255403 -.036 0.041 -.018 0.036 0.037 0.178
(0.02)
∗ (0.024)
∗ (0.049) (0.057) (0.058) (0.066)
∗∗∗
HHNumber5503 0.045 -.004 -.010 0.002 -.002 -.115
(0.047) (0.046) (0.116) (0.131) (0.129) (0.17)










Regions FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Controls for HH Size YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES
N. Obs. 10043 10023 1665 720 853 720 445 522 309
χ
2-stat. 86.763 81.409 32.562 33.217 23.576 32.441 56.706 23.25 38.712
Pseudo-R
2 0.04 0.04 0.112 0.133 0.073 0.132 0.2 0.07 0.239
NOTES - Additional controls: Age Dummies in columns (1) and (2). Age in the rest of the table.
Table 7: Impact of shocks in 2004 or 2005 on Departures of Household Members in 2005 or 2006 -








































1Arrivals Departures Arrivals Departures Departures
Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PosShock04/05 0.134 -.022 -.058 0.151 0.256 0.327 0.09 0.485 0.378
(0.129) (0.122) (0.164) (0.19) (0.239) (0.228) (0.179) (0.304) (0.277)
NegShock04/05 -.023 0.053 -.029 0.375 0.281 0.346 0.279 0.391 0.228




PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 0.199 -.229 -.288 -.479 -.127 -.599 -.502
(0.216) (0.217) (0.259) (0.286)
∗ (0.202) (0.352)
∗ (0.323)







PosShock04/05 ∗ Urban -.512 -.419 -.368
(0.395) (0.461) (0.433)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Urban 0.221 -.037 0.04
(0.3) (0.39) (0.357)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 ∗ Urban 0.295 0.289 0.549
(0.514) (0.636) (0.542)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 ∗ Urban -.080 0.42 0.238
(0.341) (0.436) (0.399)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 ∗ Female 0.593
(0.381)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age01403 ∗ Female -.037
(0.328)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Female -.453
(0.342)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Female 0.053
(0.28)
Female 0.104 -.022 0.079 -.015 -.014 0.064 -.028
(0.084) (0.071) (0.087) (0.072) (0.072) (0.195) (0.067)
School -.170 0.055 -.199 0.052 0.055 0.053 0.024 0.025 -.032
(0.096)
∗ (0.102) (0.1)
∗∗ (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.096) (0.129) (0.12)
HHHeadFemale -.383 0.177 -.387 0.185 0.169 0.184 0.166 0.293 0.275
(0.103)
∗∗∗ (0.124) (0.103)
∗∗∗ (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.112) (0.158)
∗ (0.145)
∗
HHHeadSchool 0.036 -.094 0.078 -.091 -.099 -.092 -.036 -.089 0.021
(0.099) (0.112) (0.101) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.105) (0.148) (0.136)
HHHeadWorking03 0.109 0.006 0.157 -.006 -.016 -.005 -.029 -.070 -.060
(0.151) (0.159) (0.164) (0.159) (0.159) (0.158) (0.144) (0.179) (0.171)
HHHeadWorking03 ∗ Urban -.361 0.157 -.388 0.165 0.175 0.16 0.262 0.107 0.271
(0.189)
∗ (0.223) (0.201)
∗ (0.222) (0.22) (0.221) (0.2) (0.252) (0.233)
Urban 0.44 -.014 0.461 -.022 -.165 -.019 -.130 0.076 -.154
(0.193)
∗∗ (0.212) (0.204)
∗∗ (0.211) (0.278) (0.211) (0.187) (0.375) (0.314)









HHNumber0503 0.014 -.003 0.011 -.005 -.009 -.006 -.018
(0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035)
HHNumber61403 -.018 0.033 -.015 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.025
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028)









HHNumber255403 -.086 -.001 -.084 0.0005 0.003 0.0006 0.012
(0.031)
∗∗∗ (0.033) (0.033)
∗∗∗ (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.04)
HHNumber5503 -.010 -.009 0.009 -.010 -.012 -.011 -.008
(0.056) (0.06) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.075)











Regions FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
N. Obs. 2009 4660 2009 4660 4660 4660 5301 2390 2730
χ
2-stat. 64.289 33.683 62.295 44.289 51.251 47.373 33.348 34.323 25.7
Pseudo-R
2 0.045 0.027 0.047 0.032 0.035 0.033 0.024 0.041 0.03
NOTES - Additional controls: Age Dummy for the 0-14 year-olds and its interaction with female dummy.
Table 8: Impact of shocks in 2004 or 2005 on Departures of Household Members in 2005 or 2006 -








































1Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)




NegShock04/05 0.168 -.194 0.265 -.189
(0.19) (0.178) (0.193) (0.155)












NegShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 -.504 0.347 -.593 0.289
(0.311) (0.244) (0.319)
∗ (0.236)








PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 -.116 -.332 -.172 -.174
(0.267) (0.235) (0.279) (0.235)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 -.287 0.042 -.492 -.010
(0.252) (0.236) (0.279)
∗ (0.222)
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 0.587 0.654 0.491 0.535
(0.439) (0.574) (0.458) (0.574)
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 0.429 0.048 0.546 -.001
(0.454) (0.406) (0.443) (0.379)
PosShock06 0.047 -.008 -.098 -.121
(0.192) (0.199) (0.172) (0.172)
NegShock06 -.047 -.164 -.019 -.229
(0.122) (0.104) (0.116) (0.101)
∗∗
PosShock02/03 -.045 0.156 -.054 0.123
(0.138) (0.128) (0.131) (0.119)











Regions FE NO NO YES YES
N. Obs. 4143 4654 4502 5192
χ
2-stat. 222.099 299.118 346.771 456.957
Pseudo-R
2 0.171 0.172 0.23 0.198
NOTES - Additional Controls include all those of table 5.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Coping Mechanisms and Use of Positive Income Shocks
In this appendix, I describe the means mentioned by households as coping mechanisms as well as
their use of positive income shocks.
A.1 Coping Mechanisms Declared by Households
Similarly to section2.1, the coping mechanisms shown in ﬁgure 5 are declared by the household.
Here, I restrict the sample to households that indeed faced a negative shock at least once, i.e. 525
households, out of 767, in rural areas and 464 households, out of 1018, in urban areas. I have
excluded the coping mechanisms that entail movements of household members as I describe them
separately in section 3.1.
Figure 5: Coping mechanisms used by households after negative shocks, % in rural and urban areas
In order to keep with the graphic presentation of the section 2.1, I have separated urban from
rural areas. Nevertheless, in ﬁgure 5, many responses to negative shocks are similar in the two sec-
tors. In particular, the proportions of households that dissave, decrease their consumption, decrease
investments, sell property or land, sell durable goods, take up a loan within or outside of the family,









































1As for the few other alternatives to negative shocks that diﬀer between urban and rural areas,
they stem mechanically from diﬀerences in asset holdings and economic opportunities between urban
and rural areas. In particular, it seems quite natural that the sales of livestock are used by rural
households and not by urban households. Just like livestock shocks, the use of this coping mechanism,
when compared to rural areas, is actually only three times lower in urban areas outside of Dakar
while it is seven times lower in Dakar. Similarly, leaving bills unpaid is quite speciﬁc to urban
households since rural households own their house in general and make a much more limited use of
electricity or publicly traded water.
Two other coping mechanisms that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two areas and they are
linked to labor markets. In urban areas, 8% of the households declare that a previously inactive or
unemployed household member took a job as a consequence of the income shock while only 4% of
rural households declare such a solution. At the same time, Dakar households are more likely to
take their children out of school and put them to work, although the proportion, at 2.7% is not very
high. Thus, urban households, and Dakar households more particularly, not surprisingly, have more
opportunities and leeway to generate more income in hard times.
In addition to general economic opportunities, a possible explanation of the fewer income gener-
ation schemes available to rural households could be linked to the diﬀerence in the idiosyncrasy of
shocks between the two sectors. Bad harvests may aﬀect a whole region, which makes it diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a job on a neighboring farm as it is very likely to be aﬀected as well. In fact, the correlations
between the fact that a household faces a negative shock and the fact that his community 35 faces a
negative shock are almost twice as high in rural than in urban areas: the ﬁgures are 44% and 23%,
respectively. This is reﬂected by the last coping mechanism which is used more frequently by urban
than by rural households: help outside of the family. The proportions are respectively of 21% and
16% and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 9%. So it may be easier for urban households to ask neighbors
for help because they are less likely to be aﬀected by the same shock.
This hypothesis is conﬁrmed if I go into more detail and look at the help that rural households re-
ceive in the speciﬁc case of bad harvests: 14% of the rural households whose harvest was particularly
bad at least once receive help from outside the family while this proportion stands at a signiﬁcantly
higher 21% for their rural counterparts who faced a negative shock other than bad harvests. This
may be evidence of the fact that a bad harvest declared by a household also hit his neighboring
households which makes them unable to help each other in case of a collective decrease in income.









































1However, as I do not measure the size of the income shortfall caused by each type of shock, this
diﬀerence may be stemming from diﬀerences in the extent to which income decreases after a bad
harvest and after another shock. The diﬀerence may go in either direction: bad harvests may be
less serious than other shocks on average, making households less likely to revert to external help ;
or bad harvest could be more serious than other income shocks and households may ﬁnd that help
from outside will not be suﬃcient and therefore skip it completely.
Distinguishing coping mechanism along whether they entail medium to long run adverse eﬀects,
it is somewhat reassuring that very few households take children out of school to put them to work,
as this decision could have serious consequences for a child and even make him abandon school. 36
However, households do make some decisions that can be negative in the medium run, the most
salient being the sales of livestock, which are a classic means of insurance in rural households, as
shown by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) and by Kazianga and Udry (2006). What is more
diﬃcult to assess is whether the decrease in consumption is dramatic or not and whether it entails
medium to long run consequences in terms of nutrition or health. This is something that I can
examine using measures of child health but would go beyond the scope of this study.
What I can do here, though, is examine whether households which faced three bad years use the
same coping mechanisms in their last as in their ﬁrst bad year. If households value education a lot, I
would expect them to take their children out of school only once they are left with no other option,
typically after a long strike of bad luck. If I restrict the study to households that experienced three
bad years, the sample size shrinks to 68 households in urban areas and 146 households in rural areas.
While I can hardly see any diﬀerence for rural households: they use the same coping mechanisms
during the ﬁrst as during the third bad year. Although the same is true of most coping mechanisms
used by urban households, a striking diﬀerence is that, while they decrease consumption signiﬁcantly
more during their ﬁrst bad year than during the last one (48% as against 39%), they delay decreases
in investments as much as possible: the proportion of households who decrease investments more
than doubles between the ﬁrst and the last shock, going from 11% to 25%. To maintain their levels
of investment, households borrow from the family more often during the ﬁrst shock (15% as against
9%) and are more likely to ﬁnd new occupations for inactive members (12% as against 8%). Another
interpretation not linked to the willingness to maintain investments is that the two latter sources of
relief simply dry-up with the number of shocks: it is less easy to ﬁnd lenders or to put new inactive
members to work at the third than at the ﬁrst shock.
36. As we already discussed, it is possible that some households have actually taken their children out of school as









































1A.2 The Use of Positive Income Shocks
Contrary to the shocks per se, the reactions to them from urban and rural households diﬀer in
a sizeable way when I compare positive and negative shocks. A ﬁrst important diﬀerence is in
savings. While the proportion of households who declare using their savings to smooth income
losses is almost the same in the two areas, the proportion of households who save out of income
gains increases by 2/3 when going from rural to urban households. In terms of consumption, while
the proportions of households who sell durable goods are very close in hard times, urban households,
in good times, seem more eager to consume, as 20% purchase durable goods while this is true of
only 13% of rural households. In a similar fashion, 15% of urban households spend on housing
after an income gain, almost double the proportion of rural households. There is only one major
case in which rural households seem more responsive to positive shocks: food expenditures. 49%
of rural households who gained income unexpectedly increased their food expenditure, while only
32% of urban households did. In fact, given the agrarian activities of rural households, the increase
may be not in expenditures but in consumption of own production. To probe into this, I examine
the responses of rural households who enjoyed positive shocks other than good harvests, and the
percentage mentioning an increase in consumption is exactly the same as that of urban households. 37
However, looking at the survey module on auto-consumption, I see that among households who
experienced positive shocks, the proportion of rural households who consume at least a part of their
production is the same in the group who declares an increase in consumption as a consequence of
the shock and in the group who doesn’t. It is diﬃcult from this to conclude whether enumerators
or households restricted the answers to expenditures or not as I have two contradicting elements, all
the more so as it is the proportion of own consumption that may matter in my analysis and not just
whether households conduct auto-consumption. 38 In any case, once I add food, rural households
seem to consume as much as urban households, in response to positive income shocks.
The other uses of positive income gains have a more similar trend to coping mechanisms. Similarly
to decreased investment previously, investment increases in similar proportions among urban and
rural households. Of particular interest to us is the diﬀerence in terms of transfers sent out by urban
and rural households. This diﬀerence is similar to the diﬀerence in help received by households in
bad years, although the gap is much higher here, with transfers to households facing hardships sent
37. There are 56 such households.
38. The same is true of negative shocks and the decrease in consumption. While the proportion of households
consuming their own production is similar between those who declare a decrease in consumption as a consequence
of a negative shock and those who don’t, the proportions of rural households decreasing consumption in response to









































1out by 15% in urban households, as against 8% of rural households. The same halving prevails for
“other transfers”: from 14% to 7% when comparing urban and rural households. So, the use of
transfers seems much more prevalent among urban households, both as receivers in bad times and
as senders in good times, the diﬀerence with rural households being particularly sharp in the latter
case.
Figure 6: Use of positive income shocks, % in rural and urban areas
To better understand whether spending out of positive income shocks is diﬀerent from spending
with regular (or permanent) income, I compare the use of positive shocks with the PSF survey’s
information on expenditures. 39 In ﬁgure 7, most of the ranking of ﬁgure 6 is maintained, except
for durable goods which are mentioned more often than spending on housing in response to income
shocks when compared with actual household expenditures. Other than this, even the magnitudes
of the proportions are not too far from the ﬁgures in graphic 6 except for food expenditures, which
are of course higher, and education expenditures which are much lower. This is what one would
expect: a higher average share of food expenditures in permanent income when compared to shocks
and, in contrast, a higher share for investments, in this case in education, from transitory income.
Senegalese households’ fragility is borne out by the fact that they have a 50% higher chance of
39. Excluding the “other” category, there are two categories displayed in ﬁgure 7 for which I cannot draw a com-
parison. The ﬁrst one is savings. Although I do have data on household savings at the time of the survey, I do not
have data on savings accumulated during the 12 months before the survey while the data I have on expenditures
and incomes cover those 12 months. I tried to calculate savings through simply taking expenditures out of income
(excluding transfers received) but my data shows more than 75% of households with negative savings! This may be
due to very noisy income data but, in any case, I cannot tell more about savings at this stage. I do not have much
precise information on investment, in particular in land implements, and so I also leave this category out for the









































1Figure 7: Share of household expenditures in each category, % of total expenditures in rural and
urban areas
going through a diﬃcult year than through a good year. Overall, 34% of the households in the sample
did not experience a shock, be it positive or negative, over the period. I have also explored the means
households use to smooth their incomes and how they use the extra money gained in good years.
Urban and rural households diﬀer in all these dimensions. In particular, urban households are twice
as likely to send transfers after positive income shocks than rural households. There are diﬀerent ways
to cope with shocks that I haven’t studied in which households rely on their own structure, networks
and ﬂexibility. This is what I examine in section 3 which investigates household recomposition and










































1B Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Estimates
Variable N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arrive05/06 12016 .043 .204 0 1
PosShock04/05 12206 .179 .383 0 1
NegShock04/05 12206 .316 .464 0 1
PosShock04/05 ∗ Urban 12206 .068 .251 0 1
NegShock04/05 ∗ Urban 12206 .112 .316 0 1
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 12141 .034 .182 0 1
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 12141 .057 .233 0 1
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 ∗ Urban 12141 .016 .128 0 1
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age152403 ∗ Urban 12141 .024 .154 0 1
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 12141 .050 .218 0 1
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 12141 .086 .281 0 1
PosShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 12141 .022 .148 0 1
NegShock04/05 ∗ Age255403 ∗ Urban 12141 .033 .179 0 1
HHHead 12206 .135 .342 0 1
HHHeadSpouse 12206 .114 .318 0 1
HHHeadChild 12206 .406 .491 0 1
SpouseInHH 11987 .274 .446 0 1
SpouseInHH ∗ Female 11987 .149 .356 0 1
NoParentInHH 11838 .431 .495 0 1
NoParentInHH ∗ Age01403 11803 .068 .252 0 1
Female 12206 .526 .499 0 1
Age01403 12141 .433 .495 0 1
Age152403 12141 .205 .404 0 1
Age255403 12141 .285 .451 0 1
School 11761 .509 .499 0 1
SchoolEnrolled 11676 .245 .430 0 1
SchoolEnrolled ∗ Urban 11676 .154 .361 0 1
Working03 12206 .335 .472 0 1
Working03 ∗ Urban 12206 .141 .348 0 1
HHHeadFemale 12206 .195 .396 0 1
HHHeadSchool 12206 .340 .473 0 1
HHHeadWorking03 12198 .723 .447 0 1
Urban 12206 .526 .499 0 1
NotAgrararianHH 12097 1.545 .497 1 2
HHNumber0503 10507 2.179 1.952 0 12
HHNumber61403 10507 2.852 2.238 0 13
HHNumber152403 10507 2.466 2.091 0 11
HHNumber255403 10507 2.798 1.736 0 10
HHNumber5503 10507 .781 .846 0 4
HHHeadWorking 12128 .701 .457 0 1
HHHeadWorking ∗ Urban 12128 .342 .474 0 1
HHNumber0506 11046 2.188 2.006 0 12
HHNumber61406 11046 2.994 2.355 0 13
HHNumber152406 11046 2.948 2.328 0 14
HHNumber255406 11046 3.286 2.155 0 14
HHNumber5506 11046 .918 .918 0 5
Table 13: Summary Statistics
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